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Abstract
We develop a new survey instrument to codify CEOs’ diaries in large samples and use it to
measure the labor supply of 1,114 family and professional CEOs of manufacturing ﬁrms across six
countries (Brazil, France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom and the United States). By this
measure, family CEOs work 9% fewer hours relative to professional CEOs, even when we control
for a wide range of CEO, ﬁrm and industry characteristics. The di↵erences in hours worked
between family and professional CEOs are larger when the opportunity cost of leisure is lower.
We interpret these results as evidence of di↵erences in preferences for leisure across CEOs rather
than optimal responses to organizational di↵erences correlated with ownership. Di↵erences in
labor supply are larger in countries where inheritance laws favor wealth concentration and are
correlated with di↵erences in ﬁrm performance.
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11 Introduction
The debate over the desirability of the separation between ﬁrm ownership and control is as old as
the ﬁrm itself. Should ﬁrms be led by their owners or by professional managers? The argument in
favor of owners is that they have more at stake. This is the standard prediction of the principal-
agent model, as owners are residual claimants over the income generated by the business and
hence are motivated to succeed, other things equal. The argument against is that, simply put,
other things are not equal. In particular, ﬁrm owners are typically wealthier because they own the
ﬁrm. Therefore, if leisure is a normal good,1 they might demand more leisure than professional
managers.2 Given the ubiquity of family ﬁrms, understanding which of these e↵ects prevails has
important implications for aggregate income and growth (Caselli and Gennaioli 2013, La Porta et
al 1999).
In this paper we provide evidence to inform the debate by measuring with unprecedented detail the
labor supply of family and professional CEOs. We develop a new survey instrument to codify CEOs’
diaries in large samples and use it to collect data on the time use of 1,114 CEOs of manufacturing
ﬁrms across six countries: Brazil, France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom and the United
States. To measure the CEOs’ labor supply we reconstruct their time diaries via daily phone
interviews over the course of one week. We ask respondents (the CEOs themselves or their personal
assistants) to list sequentially all activities in their diaries longer than ﬁfteen minutes and to report
details of those activities. This allows us to build an accurate bottom-up estimate of how much time
CEOs allocate to business activities. Our methodology is inspired by Mintzberg’s (1973) celebrated
analysis of the work week of ﬁve CEOs, extended to large random samples.3
We ﬁnd that there is substantial variation in the number of hours CEOs devote to work activities:
the average CEO in our sample spends 52 hours per week (10.4 hours per day) at work, while CEOs
in the bottom quartile work on average 44.2 hours per week and those in the top quartile work on
average 58.5 hours per week. To address our core question, we divide CEOs in two groups: “family”
CEOs, who own the ﬁrm or belong to the family that owns the ﬁrm, and “professional” CEOs, who
do not. We ﬁnd a stark di↵erence between these two groups: family CEOs, who account for 41%
of our sample, record 6 fewer hours per week. The di↵erence is driven by two factors: family CEOs
1For example, Holtz-Eakin et al (1993) show that large inheritances reduce labor force participation and labor
supply.
2The preferences for leisure might also arise endogenously. For example, Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) present a
model of preference formation in which wealthy parents optimally transmit a strong taste for leisure to their o↵springs.
3“Shadowing” exercises are common in the management literature but typically cover a handful of observations.
To the best of our knowledge, the most extensive CEO time use study is still Mintzberg’s (1973) seminal work, which
comprises ﬁve CEOs. The largest observational dataset on top executives known to us – Kotter (1999) – includes 15
general managers. The largest time use study of managerial personnel we are aware of is Luthans (1988), which covers
44 mostly middle managers. Some surveys ask large numbers of CEOs general questions about their aggregate time
use (e.g. McKinsey 2013), but they are not based on an analysis of their agendas for a speciﬁc time period. Compared
to more commonly used recall methods, the time-diary method reduces the impact of recollection biases that have
been shown to be relevant in other surveys (Robinson et al 2011). This notwithstanding, the diary method will also
fail to capture some activities or still allow respondents to overestimate the time they devote to other activities, so
that the hours of work recorded in our survey should be seen as a proxy of actual work hours.
2start work later in the day and are more likely to interrupt it to devote time to personal activities.
In line with earlier work (Perez-Gonzalez 2006), in our sample family and professional CEOs have
di↵erent education, experience and tenure. The ﬁrms they manage also di↵er, as family CEOs
lead ﬁrms that are smaller, less likely to be part of a multinational organization, less likely to
have a COO and with a smaller number of direct reports. In light of this evidence, di↵erences in
hours worked could be due to di↵erences in the production technology or organization that make
it optimal for family CEOs to work fewer hours. Alternatively, family CEOs may simply have a
stronger taste for leisure.
We present a simple model of CEO labor supply that makes precise the conditions under which
we can distinguish between the two hypotheses. The model illustrates that if family CEOs choose
to work fewer hours because they put a higher weight on leisure relative to ﬁrm performance, the
di↵erence in hours worked between family and professional CEOs should decrease as the opportunity
cost of leisure increases, or as the marginal cost of e↵ort decreases. In contrast, if CEOs’ work hours
are an optimal response to technology or organization di↵erences, the di↵erence between family
and professional CEOs should be una↵ected by changes in the opportunity cost of leisure or in the
marginal cost of e↵ort common to both CEO types.
We take the model to the data in two steps. First, we examine how the di↵erences in hours worked
vary once we control for observable di↵erences in CEO, industry and ﬁrm characteristics. The
analysis shows that observable di↵erences in CEOs’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics explain one quarter
of the di↵erence between family and professional CEOs: once we include the full set of ﬁrm, industry
and CEO controls, family CEOs still work 8.8% fewer hours than their professional counterparts.
Importantly, this is not due to family ownership per se: professional CEOs who run family ﬁrms
work as much as their counterparts in non-family ﬁrms.
Second, informed by the model, we use natural experiments to identify factors that a↵ect the
opportunity cost of leisure and cost of e↵ort regardless of CEO type to implement the di↵erence
in di↵erence strategy illustrated above. We identify two factors that a↵ect the opportunity cost
of leisure across ﬁrms: size and the competitiveness of the industry in which they operate. The
opportunity cost of leisure is likely to be higher in larger ﬁrms as CEOs’ e↵ort a↵ects a larger volume
of activity, analogue to the “scale of operations” e↵ect discussed in Mayer (1960).4 The opportunity
cost of leisure is also likely to be higher in more competitive industries, where the probability of
survival is lower and high e↵ort more likely to be essential to keep the ﬁrm in business. For the
largest country in our sample, India, we are also able to measure variation in the opportunity cost
of leisure and cost of e↵ort within ﬁrm across days using instances of extreme monsoon rainfall
and the broadcasting of popular sport events (Indian Premier League cricket matches).
The di↵erence in di↵erences estimates depict a consistent picture: the di↵erence between family and
professional CEOs is signiﬁcantly smaller in larger ﬁrms and in ﬁrms active in more competitive
industries where the opportunity cost of leisure is higher. Symmetrically, in our Indian sample
4This has been used to explain how small di↵erences in ability can produce large di↵erences in pay when more
able CEOs work for larger ﬁrms, see e.g. Tervio (2008).
3the di↵erence between family and professional CEOs is signiﬁcantly larger on days when torrential
rains or cricket matches increase the marginal cost of e↵ort.
Taken together, the four tests are consistent with the notion that family CEOs place a larger weight
on leisure than on ﬁrm performance. A possible explanation for this di↵erence is that family CEOs
tend to be wealthier, as they own the ﬁrms they lead, and leisure is a normal good. To test the
empirical relevance of this hypothesis in the absence of detailed data on individual CEO wealth, we
use cross-country variation in inheritance laws that creates variation in wealth concentration (Ellul
et al 2010) to proxy for the di↵erence in wealth between ﬁrm owners and professional managers.
Intuitively, more permissive laws favor the concentration of wealth in the hands of the individual
designated to inherit the control of the family business. Other things equal, we therefore expect
family CEOs to be wealthier in countries where the maximal share of transmissible wealth is larger.
We ﬁnd that the di↵erence between family and professional CEOs is increasing in the share of wealth
that can be bequeathed to a single heir. To the extent that wealth concentration is correlated with
wealth di↵erentials between owners and managers, the result provides some indicative evidence
that labor supply di↵erences may be due to wealth di↵erences.
The question that follows naturally is why family CEOs do not delegate to professionals who
are willing to work longer hours, so to enjoy both more leisure and higher proﬁts? We explore
two explanations. The ﬁrst is that family CEOs are unable to delegate due to costly contract
enforcement. To provide evidence on this hypothesis we proxy enforcement costs using measures of
GDP per capita (both at the country and region level), the quality of the rule of law (at the country
level) and generalized trust (at the region level). We ﬁnd that di↵erences in hours worked between
family and professional CEOs do not systematically vary with any of these measures. Therefore,
while the share of family CEOs is much larger in countries with worse governance (as in Burkart
et al. 2003), development and institutions do not seem to account for the systematic di↵erence in
the work patterns between family and professional CEOs.
The second hypothesis we explore is whether the di↵erence in hours worked between family and
professional CEOs has a negligible e↵ect on ﬁrm productivity, so that the potential beneﬁt of
hiring a professional CEO might be lower than the cost of doing so. To assess the relevance
of this explanation, we match our time use data with balance sheet data and estimate a basic
production function augmented by CEO hours. The estimates rule out that CEO hours have a
negligible association with productivity: the elasticity of revenues with respect to CEO hours is
.36, comparable to the labor (.48) and capital (.26) elasticities. The correlation between CEO
hours and productivity is nil in the years before the CEO took o ce, alleviating the concern that
ﬁrm time-invariant characteristics shape the CEO labor supply. CEO hours are also positively
associated with proﬁtability measures (ROCE and Tobin q). The fact that CEOs prefer to lead
their ﬁrms despite foregone income and the feasibility of delegation to hard working professionals
is in line with the idea that they might enjoy non-monetary beneﬁts of control (Demsetz and Lehn
1985, Bandiera et al 2013).
The time use patterns we observe - taken together with the association between time use and ﬁrm
4performance - provide a possible explanation for the fact that ﬁrms led by family CEOs generally
underperform (Morck et al 2000, Villalonga and Amit 2006, Perez-Gonzalez 2006, Bennedsen et
al. 2007, Bertrand et al 2008, Bertrand 2009). Our ﬁndings complement the observation that
family CEOs are less likely to adopt managerial best practices (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007) and
are characterized by a management style that is less conducive to shareholder value maximization
(Mullins and Schoar 2013). In line with these literatures, our time use analysis shows that the
incentives arising from having a higher stake in the ﬁrm may be o↵set by other factors that in-
duce less e↵ort on the part of family CEOs. More broadly, our research illustrates one channel
through which CEOs may a↵ect ﬁrm performance (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Kaplan et al 2012,
Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008, Schoar and Zuo 2012). Finally, the paper is related to the strand
of work emphasizing the importance of preferences in explaining di↵erences in managerial e↵ort
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003, Malmendier and Tate 2009).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sampling and data collection methodology,
together with the characteristics of CEOs and their ﬁrms. Section 3 provides a simple model of labor
supply to guide the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 4 estimates the di↵erence between family and
professional CEOs and implements the di↵erence in di↵erence estimator to interpret the observed
di↵erences. Section 5 exploits cross-country variation in inheritance laws and contract enforcement
to shed light on why family CEOs work less and yet choose to manage their ﬁrms. Section 6
concludes.
2 Measuring CEOs’ Labor Supply
2.1 The CEO Time Use Survey
To measure CEOs’ labor supply, we created a survey instrument that keeps track of the activities
undertaken by executives on a daily basis.5 We use this instrument to collect information for
a sample of CEOs over one work week. While titles may di↵er across countries (e.g. Managing
Director in the UK) we always interview the highest-ranking authority in charge of the organization
who has executive powers and reports to the board of directors. For brevity we refer to them as
CEOs in what follows.
The survey collects information on all the activities lasting longer than 15 minutes in the order
they happened during the day, with their starting and ending time and other activity details. Our
main measure of CEO labor supply is the sum of time devoted to work activities over the week. To
compare our diary measure with the standard recall measure used in time use survey we also asked
CEOs to estimate the hours they worked during the same week. Figure A1 shows a screenshot of
the survey tool.6
5A similar version of the survey was ﬁrst used in a small scale study of about 100 Italian CEOs. See Bandiera,
Guiso, Prat and Sadun (2011) for details.
6The survey tool can also be found online on www.executivetimeuse.org.
5The data was collected by a team of enumerators we hired for this purpose through daily phone
calls with the Personal Assistant (PA) of the CEO, or with the CEO himself (43% of the cases),
over a week randomly chosen by us. On day one of this week, the enumerator called in the morning
and gathered detailed information on all the activities planned in the CEO diary for the day.
The enumerator then called again in the evening, to gather information on the actual activities
undertaken by the CEO (including those that were not originally included in the planned agenda),
and the activities planned for the following day. On subsequent days, the enumerator called in the
evening, again to collect data on the actual activities undertaken during the day, and the planned
schedule for the next day.7 On the last day of the data collection, the analysts also interviewed the
CEO to validate the activity data (if collected through his PA) and to collect information on the
characteristics of the CEO and of the ﬁrm, including ﬁrm ownership and organizational structure.
Sampling frame
The survey covers CEOs in six of the world’s ten largest economies: Brazil, France, Germany, India,
the United Kingdom and the United States. For comparability, we chose to focus on established
market economies and opted for a balance between high and middle-low income countries.
Our sampling frame was drawn from ORBIS, an extensive commercial data set that contains
company accounts for more than 30 million companies around the world. To maintain comparability
of performance data we restricted the sample to manufacturing ﬁrms. We then selected ﬁrms with
available sales and employment data.8 This yielded a sample of 6,527 ﬁrms in 32 two-digits SIC
industries that we randomly assigned to di↵erent analysts to call to seek the CEOs’ participation.
We were able to interview 1,134 CEOs, a response rate of 17%. This ﬁgure is at the higher end of
response rates for CEO surveys, which range between 9% and 16% (Graham et al 2011). Of the
interviewed CEOs, 20 were later dropped from the sample because of low data quality (typically
because the time use data covered less than 4 days of the week). Our ﬁnal sample thus comprises
of 1,114 CEOs, of which there are 282 in Brazil, 115 in France, 125 in Germany, 356 in India, 87
in the UK and 149 in the US.
The selection analysis in Table A1 shows that respondents have on average lower log sales (coe cient
-0.071, standard error 0.011). However, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant selection e↵ect on performance
variables, such as sales over employees and return on capital employed (ROCE).
Measurement concerns
Two measurement concerns are of note. First, we are able to measure only the activities that the
CEO is willing to report. The sign of the bias this creates is ambiguous. CEOs might indeed be
7For 70% of the CEOs in our sample, the work week consisted of 5 days. The remaining 30% of the CEOs also
reported to work during the weekend (21% for 6 days and 9% for 7 days). Analysts were instructed to call the CEO
after the weekend to retrieve data on Saturdays and Sundays.
8The criteria for inclusion in the sampling frame and the survey methodology are detailed in the Data Appendix.
6prone to overestimate the hours they work, e.g. by coding time spent in personal activities as work.
At the same time, we will not pick up activities that take place out of business hours unless they
are recorded in the CEO diary. Our working assumption throughout the paper is that the time
use we measure is a valid proxy of the actual time use and captures meaningful di↵erences across
CEOs. We validate this assumption in subsequent analysis by showing the the number of hours
worked by CEOs correlates with observable CEO and ﬁrm characteristics in predictable ways (e.g.
older CEOs work fewer hours as their cost of e↵ort is presumably higher).
Second, a week of detailed activity data might not be enough to capture typical CEO behavior.
The allocation of time across activities might just be a reﬂection of high frequency shocks to the
marginal cost or marginal product of time across CEOs. If so, the time use data would capture the
relevance of these shocks, rather than explicit managerial choices. If this were true, however, we
would expect little similarity in the way the time is allocated within the week by the same CEO (i.e.
we would not see any within week autocorrelation in CEO time use). In contrast, we ﬁnd a high
degree of autocorrelation in the average number of hours worked during the week by the CEOs.
A simple regression of the number of log(hours worked) on day t on the same variable measured
on day t-1 delivers a coe cient of .40, statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In addition, CEO
ﬁxed e↵ects explain 25% of the variance observed in the daily time use data. Finally, at the end of
the survey week, we ask the CEOs to rank whether the week could be considered “representative”
of their usual work activity on a scale 1-10. Reassuringly, we observe substantial heterogeneity in
hours worked even if we restrict the sample to the 63% of CEOs who score the survey week as
highly representative (i.e. a score of 8, 9 or 10 out of 10). This is at odds with the hypothesis that
all observed variation is due to transitory shocks rather than actual di↵erences in behavior.
2.2 Basic summary statistics on the labor supply of CEOs
Figure 1 shows the distribution of hours worked during the week using the diary method, namely
the sum of the duration of all the activities the CEO undertakes while at work. The average CEO
in our sample spends 52 hours per week (10.4 hours per day) at work, while CEOs in the bottom
quartile work on average 44.2 hours per week and those in the top quartile work on average 58.5
hours per week.
Figures 2a and 2b compare the diary measure with a recall measure that we obtained by asking
CEOs to estimate the number of hours worked at the end of the week.9 Three points are of note.
First, Figure 2a shows that the distribution of the recall measure exhibits considerable bunching
at round numbers, e.g. 26% of the sample CEOs report working 50 hours, while the diary measure
shown in Figure 1 exhibits no bunching, i.e. no more than 1.5% of the sample take the same value.
Second, Figure 2b shows that the two measures are positively correlated, but the correlation is well
below 1 - regressing the recall measure on the diary measure yields a coe cient of .50, signiﬁcantly
di↵erent from 1 with p-value=.000. Third, the recall measure is larger than the diary measure for
9The sample included in this analysis excludes India since we did not collect recall time use in the ﬁrst wave of
the survey.
7half of the CEOs whose diary measure is below the mean, but only for 16% of the CEOs whose
diary measure is above the mean. Thus, the noise in the recall measure is not orthogonal to the
actual hours recorded in the diary - CEOs who work fewer hours are equally likely to over- or under
estimate their hours worked while those who work longer hours tend to underestimate it. The fact
that noise is systematic implies that it can create a spurious correlation with outcomes of interest.
Table A2 shows that total weekly hours worked are similar across countries and above 50 hours
per week on average (or above 9.8 hours a day) across all countries except India, where the average
number of hours worked across all CEOs is signiﬁcantly lower (46 weekly hours, or 8.8 hours a
day). Overall, country ﬁxed e↵ects are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level and account for about
14% of the variation in total hours worked observed in the data. In contrast, industry ﬁxed e↵ects
- while being jointly signiﬁcant at the 1% level - account for only 3% of the overall cross sectional
variation in total hours worked. While in the main analysis we rely primarily on within country,
within industry comparisons of CEO hours worked across di↵erent ownership types, we exploit
cross country variation in the last part of the paper to examine various alternative explanations for
the patterns observed in our data.
2.3 Di↵erences between family and professional CEOs in the raw data
In our sample 57% of the ﬁrms are owned by a family, 23% by disperse shareholders, 9% by private
individuals, and 7% by private equity. Family CEOs are CEOs who belong to the family that owns
the ﬁrm, and account for 41% of the sample. Of these, 329 (30% of the sample) are descendants
of the original founders, and 126 (11%) are the founders themselves. As our research question
addresses the di↵erence in labor supply between CEOs who own (at least in part) the ﬁrm they
manage and professional CEOs who do not, we pool across generations of family CEOs in most
of the analysis that follows. After showing the main results, we will brieﬂy discuss the di↵erences
between founders and descendants. Professional CEOs are CEOs who have no family bond with
the owners of the ﬁrm. These account for 59% of the sample. Just over a quarter of them (16%
of the sample) manage ﬁrms that are owned by a family. Later this will allow us to separate the
e↵ect of family ownership from the e↵ect of family CEOs.
CEO labor supply
Figure 3 plots the distribution of weekly hours worked by family and professional CEOs as they
appear in the raw data. While there is a wide heterogeneity in hours worked across both types of
CEOs, the distribution of hours worked by family CEOs is entirely shifted to the left relative to
professional CEOs. Table 1, Panel A provides some additional summary statistics to better qualify
the nature of this di↵erence. The ﬁrst and second rows report the recall and diary measures of hours
worked described earlier. By both measures family CEOs work fewer hours, but the di↵erence is
much larger (6.2 vs 3.6 hours) when we use the diary measure, as family CEOs tend to overestimate
their time at work while professional CEOs underestimate it. The di↵erence remains stable (6.8
8hours) when we only count work activities (that is dropping travel time and personal time) that
last longer than 15 minutes. The di↵erence between ownership types is due to two factors. Family
CEOs start working later in the morning, at 9.16AM vs. 8.31AM for professional managers, and
devote a larger share of time to personal activities during business hours (12.3% vs 8.6%).
CEO, ﬁrm and industry characteristics
In line with earlier work (Perez-Gonzalez 2006), in our sample family and professional CEOs have
di↵erent education, experience and tenure. The ﬁrms they manage also di↵er, as family CEOs lead
ﬁrms that are smaller, less likely to be part of a multinational organization, less likely to have a
COO and with a smaller number of direct reports.
We illustrate these points in Table 1, Panels B and C. Panel B shows that family and professional
CEOs have similar demographics: the average CEO is 51 years old and 96% of the sample CEOs
are men. However, the share of “skilled” CEOs (as measured by the attainment of a college degree
and/or an MBA) is signiﬁcantly lower (90% vs. 94% for a college degree, p-value ¡.1, and 43% vs
63% for an MBA degree, p-value<.01). Family CEOs are also less likely to have worked abroad
(39% vs. 54% , p-value<.01) and more likely to have longer tenure both as CEOs (15 vs 7 years,
p-value<.01) and in other positions with the same ﬁrm (23 vs 13 years, p-value<.01).
Panel C shows that the average ﬁrm in our sample has 1571 employees and that family CEOs
manage smaller ﬁrms (1036 vs 1945 employees, p-value>.1). 24% of the sample ﬁrms are part
of foreign multinationals, and these are less likely to be managed by family CEOs (19% vs 28%,
p-value<.01). The organization of the ﬁrm also di↵ers: family CEOs have fewer direct reports (7.4
vs 8, p-value<.05) and are also less likely to have a COO (18% vs 31%, p-value<.01), while they
are much more likely to have their o↵springs in executive positions within the ﬁrm (.24 sons and
.09 daughters vs. .005 and .006, p-values<.01).
Finally, Panel D describes the external environment in which the sample ﬁrms operate. 57% of the
sample ﬁrms are located in emerging economies (India or Brazil), with this number being higher for
ﬁrms led by family CEOs (78% vs 43%, p-value<.01). The sample ﬁrms are distributed across 32
di↵erent SIC2 sectors, the largest of which, SIC 28 (Chemicals and Allied Products), accounts for
13% of the ﬁrms. The distribution of family and professional CEOs are generally balanced across
sectors. We reject the null that the sector dummies do not predict CEO type only for 4 out of the
32 sectors, three of which account for less than 2% of the sample each. In line with this, Panel
D shows that family and professional CEOs face a similar level of product market competition, as
measured by the Lerner Index, which is deﬁned as (1-proﬁt/sales) calculated as the average across
the entire population of ﬁrms in Orbis in the sample countries for the 5 years preceding the data
collection, and is speciﬁc to the ﬁrms’ three digit industry (Aghion et al, 2005). We obtain similar
results when we use as a proxy for product market competition the degree of import penetration,
measured as the share of total imports relative to domestic production in the industry in which the
9ﬁrm operates, also aggregated up at the industry level.10
In Section 4 we will explore the extent to which di↵erences in hours worked between family and
professional CEOs observed in the raw data can be accounted for by the di↵erences in CEO and
ﬁrms characteristics just discussed. Before turning to the data, however, we introduce a simple
theoretical framework that will inform the empirical analysis.
3 A Simple Model of CEO Labor Supply
In the previous section we have shown that family CEOs tend to work fewer hours relative to pro-
fessional CEOs. In this section we present a simple model of CEO time use that allows us to specify
the conditions under which observed di↵erences in hours worked between family and professional
CEOs may be interpreted as optimal responses to unobservable organizational or technological dif-
ferences or, alternatively, as evidence of di↵erent CEO preferences for leisure. The model does not
do justice to the literature on managerial incentives in corporate governance (Tirole 2006), but it
does supply a parsimonious set-up to discuss the identiﬁcation problem we face when interpreting
the di↵erence in hours worked by family and professional CEOs examined in Table 1 in a cross
sectional setting.
3.1 Basic set-up
The model contains two main elements: a production function that depends on CEO work time
in ways that depend on a) the characteristics of the CEO and the ﬁrm and; b) CEO preferences.
Time allocated to an activity is taken as a proxy for CEO attention which, as in Milgrom and
Geanakoplos (1991), is akin to a factor of production. Starting with technology, the productivity
of a ﬁrm is given by:
ygs = ygs +( ag + bs)hgs  
1
2
h2
gs,
where g 2 {F,P} indicate the type of CEO - family or professional - and s 2 {L,H} denotes a
binary state of the world, to be discussed later. The ﬁrm’s performance ygs depends on the number
of hours that the CEO works, hgs. The marginal productivity of a CEO hour depends on his type
and the state of the world through ag and bs respectively. The negative quadratic term captures
the idea that the marginal return of CEO time is decreasing.
The ﬁrm’s performance may also depend directly on the CEO type and on the state of the world
through ygs. The only restriction that our formulation imposes, by having additive ag and bs rather
than a generic ags, is that the identity of the CEO does not interact directly with the state of the
world in determining the marginal e↵ect of CEO time on performance. We do not take a stand
on whether productivity is higher or lower in ﬁrms run by family CEOs or professional CEOs: yFs
10See the Data Appendix for more information on the construction of the Lerner and the import penetration
variables.
10can be greater or smaller than yPs. We also remain agnostic as to whether the return to CEO time
is higher or lower for family compared to professional CEOs: aF can be greater or smaller than
aP. For example, the marginal productivity of a professional CEO might be di↵erent from that of
a family CEO because the family CEO can delegate more easily to other family members who are
more likely to work for the ﬁrm, as seen in Table 1.
The CEO’s utility depends on the performance of the ﬁrm and on the cost of spending time at
work:
ugs = cgy   dshgs,
where cg represents the relative weight of ﬁrm performance and work hours in the preference of a
CEO of type g; and ds captures the possibility that the cost of e↵ort, or the opportunity cost of
leisure, depends on the state of the world.11
In this simple set-up, given technology and preferences, the number of hours maximizing CEO
payo↵ is derived as:
h⇤
gs = ag + bs  
ds
cg
, (1)
3.2 Identiﬁcation
Equation (1) illustrates the main identiﬁcation problem we face, i.e. the the cross-sectional di↵er-
ence between the hours worked by family and professional CEOs can be due to either di↵erences
in ﬁrm technology or organization that di↵er by CEO type and determine his productivity - ag -
or by di↵erences in preferences that determine his cost of e↵ort - cg.
There are, however, a set of conditions under which we can use natural experiments that create
variation in the state of the world to identify at least the sign of the di↵erence between cF and
cP. More speciﬁcally, variation in the state of the world that a↵ects the opportunity cost of
leisure/marginal cost of e↵ort ds to the same extent for both CEO types can be used to identify
di↵erences in preferences.
To see this, suppose that the cost of e↵ort is higher (or the opportunity cost of leisure lower)
in state H than in state L (dH >d L). In this case, we can show that, even if a change in the
state of the world may a↵ect the marginal productivity of CEO work through bs, the sign of the
di↵erence-in-di↵erences depends on the preference parameter cg only:
Proposition 1. The di↵erence in di↵erence in hours worked over CEO type and state of the world
has the same sign as the di↵erence in the preference parameter of family CEOs and professional
CEOs. Formally, if dH>dL then h⇤
PH   h⇤
FH >h ⇤
PL  h⇤
FL if and only if cP>cF.12
11Note that the utility function can be rewritten as ugs =
cg
dsy   hgs, hence the parameter ds captures di↵erences
in the trade-o↵ between ﬁrm performance and leisure.
12Proof. Given the optimal h and the assumption that dH>dL,
sign[h
⇤
FL  h
⇤
FH   (h
⇤
NL   h
⇤
NH)] = sign
h
dH
cF  
dL
cF  
dH
cN +
dL
cN
i
= sign
h
 
⇣
1
cN  
1
cF
⌘
(dH   dL)
i
= sign[cN   cF]
11Intuitively, if preferences are the same across CEOs, and the di↵erence between family and profes-
sional CEOs is solely driven by di↵erences in technology or organization that di↵er by CEO type
and determine their productivity ag, an increase in the marginal cost of e↵ort ds that a↵ects both
types equally should make both types reduce hours worked to the same extent, leaving their di↵er-
ence constant. By the same logic, if the di↵erence in hours worked across CEOs instead increases
with the shock, this is consistent with the idea that family CEOs have a stronger preference for
leisure relative to ﬁrm performance.
4 Evidence on CEOs’ Labor Supply
4.1 Cross-sectional di↵erences
Main results
The ﬁrst step in our analysis consists of assessing the extent to which the di↵erence in hours
worked between family and professional CEOs shows in Table 1 using the raw time use data can
be explained by observable CEO, ﬁrm and industry di↵erences across CEO types. To this end, we
estimate a simple regression model of the form:
hijc = ↵Fami + Ci  + Fi  +  j + ⌘c + "ijc (2)
Where hijc is the log of total weekly hours worked by CEO i in industry j in country c, Fami =1i f
ﬁrm i is owned by a family and the CEO belongs to the family, while Fami =0i fﬁ r mi is led by a
professional CEO regardless of ownership status, C,F are vectors of CEO and ﬁrm characteristics,
 j are industry ﬁxed e↵ects and ⌘c are country ﬁxed e↵ects.
Table 2 reports the estimates of (2) with a progressively larger set of controls that account for the
di↵erences in CEO traits, ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁrm organizational structure that proxy for the
parameter ag in equation (1).
Column 1 shows that the unconditional di↵erence between the hours worked of family and profes-
sional CEOs is .18 log points. Column 2 shows that one third of this di↵erence is due to di↵erences
across countries, namely CEOs in emerging economies record fewer hours and family CEOs are
more likely to be located there (Table A2). Adding country ﬁxed e↵ects reduces the di↵erence from
.18 to .113 log points.
In Column 3 we explore the extent to which the di↵erences in hours worked between family and
professional CEOs may be driven by di↵erences in CEO demographics, professional background
and skills. We ﬁnd that older CEOs tend to work fewer hours (coe cient on log CEO age is -
0.157, signiﬁcant at the 1% level), while proxies for CEO skills (college degree and MBA dummy,
and an indicator to denote CEOs with work experience abroad) are all positively but only weakly
correlated with hours worked (only the college degree dummy is signiﬁcant at the 10% level). The
12inclusion of these additional controls leaves the coe cient on the family CEO dummy practically
unchanged, and still signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
In Column 4 we examine the association between industry and ﬁrm characteristics and CEO hours
worked by including a full set of industry dummies (deﬁned at the SIC 2 level), and a set of
variables likely to a↵ect the magnitude and the complexity of CEO workload such as ﬁrm size
(in terms of employees), ﬁrm age and a dummy denoting ﬁrms that are either domestic or foreign
multinationals to capture the possibility of extended working hours due to the necessity of managing
across di↵erent time zones. Among these variables, ﬁrm size stands out as the only one positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with CEO hours worked. A 1% increase in ﬁrm size is associated with
a 2.4% increase in CEO hours worked. Overall, industry ﬁxed e↵ects, CEO and ﬁrm characteristics
explain a small portion of the di↵erence in hours worked between family and professional CEOs,
which falls from .113 log points in Column 2 to .110 when CEO characteristics are included and
further to .104 when ﬁrm characteristics are added to the set of controls (Column 4).
In Column 5 we turn to examining the association between CEO hours worked and a set of organi-
zational characteristics, i.e. the number of CEO direct reports, a dummy to denote the presence of
a COO, and the number of sons and/or daughters employed in senior managerial positions. These
variables are of particular interest for our purposes, since they di↵er systematically between ﬁrms
managed by family and professional CEOs - as shown in Table 1 - and may at the same time
signiﬁcantly shape overall the demands on CEO time. 13 Di↵erences in organizational structure
are indeed correlated with CEO hours worked. Namely, CEOs who have a larger number of direct
reports work longer hours, while those whose sons hold senior management positions in the ﬁrm
work fewer hours. Di↵erences in organizational structure further reduce the coe cient on family
CEOs, but this remains large (.088) and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Overall, while di↵erences in CEO, industry, ﬁrm and organizational characteristics appear to explain
some of the observed variation in CEO hours worked, the correlation between any of these variables
and hours worked is an order of magnitude smaller than the e↵ect of CEO type. For example, in
column (6) the college degree dummy is associated with an increase in hours worked of .063 log
points (standard error 0.029), a one standard deviation increase in ﬁrm size increases hours worked
by .032 log points, a one standard deviation increase in the number of direct reports increases
hours worked by .026 log points, and a one standard deviation increase in the number of sons in
management decreases hours worked by .018 log points.
Column 6 further probes the robustness of the family CEO result to the inclusion of a set of
interview noise controls, which proxies for the systematic di↵erences in measurement error across
CEO types. Reassuringly, the inclusion of these controls leaves the magnitude and the signiﬁcance
of the family CEO dummy unchanged. We also note that there is no correlation between the
identity of the survey respondent (the PA or the CEO himself) and hours worked, which allays
concerns that PAs have more limited information or that CEOs who choose to report their own
13For example, the presence of other family members in top managerial positions may facilitate the distribution of
CEO workload across a team of trusted managers (Bloom et al, 2013).
13time use overstate hours worked. 14
Table A3 in appendix shows additional robustness checks including results when we express the
dependent variable in terms of levels instead of logs, the use of a negative binomial regressions to
take into account the count nature of the hours data, the inclusion of industry*country ﬁxed e↵ects,
and estimating the regression separately for developing (Brazil and India) and developed (France,
Germany, UK and US) economies, and between the ﬁrst wave of the survey (which focused on India
exclusively) and the second wave of the survey (in which all the other countries were covered). The
magnitude and signiﬁcance of the family CEO dummy are remarkably stable across all experiments.
Since 16% of the sample ﬁrms are owned by a family and managed by a professional CEO we can
separately identify the e↵ect of family CEOs from the e↵ect of family ownership. Column 7 shows
that professional CEOs working in ﬁrms owned by a founder or a family are statistically undis-
tinguishable from other professional CEOs. We interpret this ﬁnding as prima facie evidence that
the di↵erences in hours worked between family and professional CEOs are not due to unobservable
technological characteristics that are speciﬁc to family ﬁrms.
Finally, Column 8 replicates the analysis using the recall measure to shed light on whether profes-
sional CEOs might be more likely to overstate hours worked to impress the board. If so, we would
expect the di↵erence to be larger when using the recall measure that is easier to manipulate. In
contrast, Column 8 shows that the di↵erence is smaller. This is consistent with the fact that - as
shown in Table 1 - family CEOs are more likely to overstate hours worked relative to professional
CEOs.
Founder CEOs
In our baseline speciﬁcations we group founder CEOs and their descendants in the same category,
since in both cases these CEOs have a direct and sizable ownership stake in the company they run.
Appendix Tables A4 and A5 provide additional evidence on the di↵erence between founders and
their descendants. Table A4 shows that, unconditionally, founders work 1.3 fewer hours per week
relative to professional CEOs, but they are also are older, less educated, have longer tenure and
are mostly located in emerging economies. Once all observable characteristics are controlled for,
Columns 5 and 6 in Table A5 show that both founder and descendant CEOs work 9% fewer hours
than professional CEOs. While it is important to notice that the founders managed ﬁrms in our
sample are not start-ups (the average founder has been managing his ﬁrm for 22 years), the ﬁnding
that founder and descendant CEOs behave similarly is in line with recent ﬁndings that both adopt
worse managerial practices (Bloom et al 2012) and that they share a similar business philosophy
and ﬁrm governance (Mullins and Schoar 2013).
14The coe cient remains stable at .088 even if we include all the other noise controls but we remove the variable
capturing the identity of the respondent.
14Summary
Taken together, di↵erences in CEO and ﬁrm observable characteristics, including family ownership,
explain a quarter of the di↵erence in total hours between family and professional CEOs. The re-
maining gap in hours worked might be due to unobservable di↵erences in technology or organization
that are speciﬁc to family ﬁrms, but only when managed by family CEOs, or to di↵erences in the
preferences of the CEOs. We attempt to disentangle these two potential sources of variation in
Section 4.2 below.
4.2 Di↵erence in Di↵erences
State of the world variation I: across ﬁrms
Informed by Proposition 1, we exploit di↵erences in factors that a↵ect the CEO opportunity cost
of leisure as a way to isolate the role of di↵erences in managerial preferences in explaining the lower
number of hours worked by family CEOs relative to professional CEOs. We look speciﬁcally at two
such factors: ﬁrm size and the level of competition the ﬁrm is exposed to. In both cases, the intuition
is straightforward. The opportunity cost of leisure is likely to be higher in larger ﬁrms because the
CEO controls a larger volume of activity. Therefore, the marginal hour of leisure deprives more
people of the input of the CEO, and each decision not taken during that hour has larger monetary
value. This is akin to the “scale of operations” e↵ect (Mayer 1960). Symmetrically, the opportunity
cost of leisure is likely to be higher in more competitive settings because the baseline probability
of survival is lower, and CEO e↵ort is more likely to be essential to keep the ﬁrm in business. The
marginal hour of leisure can make the di↵erence between ﬁrm death and survival in competitive
industries while its consequences are less dire for ﬁrms that are sheltered from competition.
Table 3 reports the estimates of
hijc = ↵Fami +  Fami ⇤ Xij +  Xij + Ci' + Fi  +  j + ⌘c + "ijc (3)
where Xij is a measure of ﬁrm i size, or a measure of competition in industry j, and all other
variables are as deﬁned above. Proposition 1 makes clear that, under the assumption that the
opportunity cost of leisure is higher in larger ﬁrms and in more competitive industries, the di↵erence
in di↵erence parameter   has the same sign as the di↵erence in preferences between professional
and family CEOs, namely  > 0 implies that, compared to family CEOs, professional CEOs put
more weight on ﬁrm performance relative to leisure.
In Table 3 we use two measures of ﬁrm size, number of employees and revenues, and two measures
of competition, the Lerner index and import penetration, both deﬁned at the industry (SIC 3
and ISIC Rev1, respectively) level. The estimates in columns 1 to 4 reveal a consistent picture:
when the opportunity cost of leisure is higher, the di↵erence in hours worked between family and
professional CEOs is smaller. The estimates of   are positive and statistically di↵erent from zero for
all four measures, and the magnitudes are economically meaningful. The di↵erence between family
15and professional CEOs is .13 (.12) log points in ﬁrms at the 10th percentile of the distribution
of log employment (log sales) but only .04 (.05) log points in ﬁrms at the 90th percentile. Thus,
family CEOs in large ﬁrms work almost as much as their professional counterparts, while those in
small ﬁrms work signiﬁcantly less. Likewise, the di↵erence between family and professional CEOs
is .11 (.12) log points in low competition industries at the 10th percentile of the Lerner (import
penetration) index but only .05 (.05) log points in high competition industries at the 90th percentile.
In light of Proposition 1, the di↵erence in di↵erences estimates with respect to size and competition
indicates that family CEOs put lower weight on ﬁrm performance relative to leisure, that is cP >c F.
An observationally equivalent explanation is that there is a distribution of preferences for leisure
among family CEOs, and variation in the opportunity cost of leisure at the ﬁrm or industry level
determines selection, so that leisure-loving family CEOs are only found in small ﬁrms and low-
competition industries. In this case, leisure-loving family CEOs drop out rather than working
longer hours, but di↵erences in preferences still explain di↵erences in hours worked. To shed light
on whether family and professional CEOs adjust their hours di↵erently in response to shocks, the
next subsection exploits variation in the cost of e↵ort across days.
State of the world variation II: across days
For the largest of our sample countries - India (357 CEOs) - we are able to exploit shocks a↵ecting
the cost of CEO e↵ort during our sample week. We focus on India because the data collection
period coincided with monsoon rainfall and a popular sport tournament, both of which increased
the cost of e↵ort on some days but not on others.15 Extreme rainfall disrupts local transportation in
urban areas (where most of the CEOs in our sample are located), adding delays and inconveniences
that increase the cost of e↵ort. We obtain rainfall data for all the major weather stations in India
and classify a day as having extreme rain if its deviation from the pre-monsoon benchmark falls in
the upper third of the station level distribution of the same variable. By this measure, 256 CEOs
experience extreme rain at least once during the survey week.16
The second natural experiment we exploit is the broadcasting of important cricket matches. Cricket
is the most popular sport in India, and the cost of e↵ort is likely to be higher during a match for
an average individual, including CEOs. For this test we take advantage of the fact that our data
collection partially overlapped with the playo↵s, semiﬁnals and ﬁnals of a major cricket tournament,
the Indian Premier League (IPL). We collect data on the timing of these matches and classify a
15The expected arrival of the monsoon is around June 1
st, starting from the southwestern coast of Kerala, and
gradually covering the entirety of India by July 15
th.
16To build the rain shock variable we proceed in four steps. First, we obtain rainfall data for all the major weather
stations in India starting in May through the end of July 2011. Second, we use this data to compute the average
station level rainfall in the pre-monsoon period in May, and for each station level observation in June and July we
compute the percentage di↵erence in rainfall with respect to the pre-monsoon period. Third, we deﬁne a given day
to have extreme rain if its deviation from the May benchmark falls in the upper third of the station level distribution
of the same variable. Fourth, we match the CEO time use information with the rainfall data of the closest weather
station by using the modal (manually collected) zip code of the activities undertaken by the CEO during the week.
Further details on the construction of this variable is provided in the Data Appendix.
16day to have a cricket match if one is broadcasted on the day. 28 CEOs are exposed to at least one
match during the survey week.
Table 4 uses the total hours of work at the daily level to estimate the following di↵erence in
di↵erences speciﬁcation:
hid = ↵Fami +  Fami ⇤ Xd +  Xd + Ci⇢ + Fi' + Si  + Ii⌘ + "id (4)
where hid is one plus the log of daily hours worked by CEO i on day d, Fami =1i fC E Oi
belongs to the owning family as deﬁned above, Xd =1i fd a yd has extreme rainfall in Columns
1-2 and a cricket match in Columns 3-6 and C,F,S,I are vectors of CEO, ﬁrm, state and industry
characteristics as deﬁned in equation 2; standard errors are clustered at the CEO level to take into
account unobservables that a↵ect a given CEO over the week.17 The coe cient of interest is  ,t h e
di↵erence in di↵erences estimator that measures how di↵erent CEOs react to higher marginal cost
of e↵ort.
Column 1 replicates our baseline speciﬁcation using daily data from India alone, controlling for
extreme rain. The estimate in column 1, Table 4 indicates that, in line with earlier estimates,
the di↵erence between family and professional CEOs is .07 log points while the e↵ect of extreme
rain is small and not signiﬁcant. Column 2 shows that the di↵erence in di↵erences coe cient is
 .083 and precisely estimated at the 5% level. In light of Proposition 1, this indicates that family
CEOs put lower weight on ﬁrm performance, that is cP >c F. The results in column 2 also indicate
that family CEOs do not make up lost time by working more on days without extreme rain. The
di↵erence between family and professional CEOs on days without extreme rain is negative rather
than positive and not signiﬁcantly di↵erent from zero.
The model indicates that the di↵erence in di↵erences estimate identiﬁes the sign of the di↵erence in
preferences if and only if the cost shock (rain) a↵ects all CEOs equally regardless of ﬁrm ownership.
This assumption fails if factors correlated with family ownership a↵ect the e↵ect of rain shocks on
the marginal cost or the marginal product of CEO time, namely cov("id,Fami ⇤ Raind) 6= 0.
For example, ﬁrms run by family CEOs might have characteristics that make them more prone
to be disrupted by rain (for example, due to the presence of old machinery or bad maintenance
processes). To test the robustness of the results to these factors, in Appendix Table A6a we
augment the speciﬁcation with additional CEO and ﬁrms controls and interactions between rain
and state, and between industry, CEO and ﬁrm characteristics. Reassuringly, the inclusion of these
interactions does not generally a↵ect the magnitude and precision of the di↵erence in di↵erence
estimate allaying the concern that this captured unobservables at the ﬁrm day level.
Column 3 shows that on days when cricket matches are played the average CEO works 5.8% fewer
hours. Column 4 shows that the di↵erence in di↵erences   is negative ( .049) albeit not precisely
estimated. Since IPL matches are generally held in the evenings, we can use the exact timings
of activities to increase the precision of our estimates. To do so, we divide the work day in two
17In the cricket regressions the standard errors are clustered at the CEO and day level.
17intervals, before and after 3PM18. This analysis (shown in columns 5 and 6) shows that professional
CEOs increase their hours worked in advance of cricket games, while they tend to work signiﬁcantly
less in the hours immediately preceding the game (from 3PM onwards). In contrast, family CEOs
work fewer hours throughout the day. Therefore, while all CEOs reduce hours to watch the match
in the afternoon, professional CEOs compensate by working harder before the match, while family
CEOs do not. Finally, Appendix Table A6b allows for a rich set of interactions between cricket
matches and CEO, ﬁrm, industry and state characteristics. The conclusions are generally robust
to these more ﬂexible speciﬁcations.19
Taken together, the results in this section cast doubt on the explanation that di↵erences in hours
worked are optimal responses to di↵erences in ﬁrm level technology or organization, and rather point
to the fact that the leisure-performance tradeo↵ di↵ers between family and professional CEOs, with
the former putting a larger weight on leisure. The next section provides indicative evidence of why
that might be the case.
5 Mechanisms
5.1 Wealth and the demand for leisure
The di↵erence in hours worked between family and professional CEOs can be rationalized with a
simple labor supply model where leisure is a normal good and family CEOs have more non-labor
income or wealth. While it is intuitive that the average family CEO, who owns a sizable share
of the ﬁrm, may be wealthier than the average professional CEOs, who owns a small share of the
ﬁrm (if any), a test of the hypothesis requires comparing the di↵erence in hours worked at di↵erent
levels of wealth di↵erentials. Measuring personal wealth via surveys is notoriously di cult and we
have no information, let alone a plausible source of variation, on the CEOs’ wealth.
Instead, we approach this question using as a proxy for wealth di↵erentials between family and
professional CEOs exploiting cross-country di↵erences in inheritance laws compiled by Ellul et al
(2010), which provide a country-speciﬁc measure of the largest share of the family wealth that can
be bequeathed to a single heir. Intuitively, more permissive laws favor the concentration of wealth
in the hands of the individual designated to inherit the control of the family business. Other things
equal, we therefore expect family CEOs to be wealthier in countries where the maximal share of
transmissible wealth is larger. To test whether this results in larger di↵erences in hours worked
between family and professional CEOs we estimate:
hijc = ↵Fami +  Fami ⇤ (Sc   ¯ S)+Ci' + Fi  +  j + ⌘c + "ijc (5)
where Sc is the largest admissible inheritance share in country c and ¯ S is the sample mean. Standard
18We obtain similar results using 2pm and 4pm as alternative cuto↵ times.
19The interaction Family CEO*Cricket game retains its negative sign but loses signiﬁcance at conventional levels
when we include a full set of CEO characteristics*Cricket interactions (Table A4b, column 2) and when we include
ﬁrm characteristics*Cricket interactions (Table A4b, column 3).
18errors are clustered at the country level and bootstrapped using the wild bootstrapping technique
proposed by Cameron et al (2008) given the small number of clusters. Our coe cient of interest
is  , the interaction between the family CEO dummy and the inheritance share variable. Under
the assumption that the latter proxies for family CEOs wealth, the hypothesis that the demand
for leisure is increasing in wealth implies   < 0. We scale Sc in deviation from its sample mean,
so that the coe cient on the family CEO dummy ↵ measures the di↵erence between family and
professional CEOs at the mean values of Sc. Sc ranges from .5 (France and India) to 1 (UK and
US).20
Column 1, Table 5 reports the estimates of (5). We ﬁnd   < 0 and precisely estimated. Its
magnitude implies that going from an average share of .69 to the highest share of 1 increases the
di↵erence in hours worked by .07 log points, 79% of the mean e↵ect. In other words, family CEOs
located in countries with the average level of the inheritance variable work 9% fewer hours than
professional CEOs; those in countries with the highest level of the inheritance variable work 16%
fewer hours than professional CEOs. Below we show that these ﬁndings are robust to allowing the
e↵ect of family CEOs to be heterogeneous along other dimensions that might vary at the country
or regional level.
5.2 Unable or unwilling to delegate?
The results discussed above suggest that family CEOs demand more leisure, possibly because they
are wealthier. The question that naturally arises is why do they work at all, that is why don’t
family CEOs simply delegate their role to professional managers? One possibility is that delegation
is prohibitively costly in countries with poor contract enforcement like India (Bloom et al 2013).
If delegation costs entirely explain why family CEOs stay at the helm of their ﬁrms, we should
observe no di↵erence in the time use of family and professional CEOs in countries where contracts
are easily enforced. Intuitively, when delegation is feasible all family CEOs who have a higher
marginal utility of leisure should delegate to hard working professionals and enjoy the extra proﬁts
these generate, while the only family CEOs who choose not to delegate should work as hard as
professional CEOs.
To test this hypothesis, Columns 2-5 in Table 5 estimate (5) using di↵erent proxies of contract
enforcement in lieu of S. Column 2 uses regional GDP, a country speciﬁc measure of the level of
development (Gennaioli et al, 2013), which is presumably correlated with the quality of contractual
enforcement. Column 3 uses cross-country di↵erences in the rule of law and Column 4 uses regional
variation in the level of generalized trust, which we take as a proxy for the ease to manage incomplete
20For India we refer to the Hindu Succession Act (1956) that stipulates that the head of a family ﬁrm (HUF or
Hindu United Family) must bequeath his share of the ﬁrm in equal parts to all members of the HUF. In our sample,
81% of the family ﬁrms are conﬁrmed HUF but we do not know the number of members (for 19% we could not ﬁnd
information on HUF status). We take 0.5 to be the upper bound of the inheritance share as there must be at least
two members in a HUF. Results are robust to assuming there are three surviving members hence the maximal share
is 0.33. In contrast, Ellul et al (2010) use the value from the Indian Succession Act. This, however, does not apply
to Hindus who account for 80.5% of the population.
19contracts (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012). As above, we scale these variables in deviation
from their sample means. Columns 2-4 show that none of the interactions with these country-
speciﬁc measures are signiﬁcant. Finally, Column 5 includes together all the interactions between
the family CEO dummy and all the proxies of contract enforcement, plus the interaction with the
inheritance law variable discussed in the previous section. The latter remains of a similar magnitude
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Taken together, the ﬁndings in Table 5 cast some doubts on the hypothesis that family CEOs would
prefer to delegate but are not able to do so due to costly contract enforcement. Instead, family
CEOs appear to be unwilling rather than unable to delegate. We speculate on possible reasons
below.
5.3 CEO hours and ﬁrm performance
The last possibility we investigate is that the di↵erences in hours worked between family and
professional CEOs has a negligible e↵ect on ﬁrm productivity. If this were the case, it would not be
worth incurring the cost of hiring a professional CEO. To assess whether di↵erences in hours worked
across CEOs are associated with di↵erences in productivity we use panel data at the ﬁrm-year level
to estimate a basic production function of the form:
yit = ↵llit + ↵kkit + ↵mmit + ↵hhi +  
0
Zit + uit (6)
Where yit are sales, lit is labor, kit capital, mit materials of ﬁrm i at time t and lower case letters
denote natural logarithms. CEO log daily hours worked are denoted by hi. To the extent that our
measures reﬂect time use shocks that hit in that particular week or biases in reporting time use
that are orthogonal to yearly ﬁrm outcomes, the estimated coe cients will be biased towards zero.
The accounting data are extracted from accounts published on ORBIS. We restrict the analysis to
the years in which the manager we interviewed actually had the role of CEO, and for each ﬁrm
we keep the three most recent years in the data to avoid selection on CEOs with longer tenure.
We also include a vector of interview noise controls as in previous speciﬁcations, and full set of
year*country and industry*country dummies to control for di↵erences in the business cycle across
industries and countries. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level to account for correlated
shocks within the same ﬁrm through time.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 6. Column 1 shows that the association between
hours worked and log sales controlling for employment is positive and precisely estimated: a 1%
change in weekly hours worked is associated with a 0.45% increase in labor productivity. Including
controls for capital and materials reduces the magnitude of the coe cient on log hours to 0.36, but
leaves its signiﬁcance unchanged (column 2). For comparison, a 1% increase in capital (employment)
is associated with a 0.26% (0.48%) increase in log sales. Using the coe cient on CEO hours worked
estimate of column 2, increasing hours worked by the amount of the di↵erence between family and
professional CEOs is associated with a 6% increase in productivity (0.364*.168, i.e. the coe cient
20on log hours worked of column 2 multiplied by the di↵erence in log hours worked between family
and professional CEOs shown in Table 1, third row from the top).
While in the absence of exogenous variation in hours worked we cannot identify causal e↵ects,
columns 3 and 4 present two placebo tests that partially allay concerns that the observed correlation
is due to reverse causality or measurement error. First, we observe 357 ﬁrms at least one year before
the appointment of the current CEO. This allows us to test whether unobservable time-invariant
ﬁrm characteristics correlated with ﬁrm performance determine hours worked. If this were the case,
we should observe that productivity and hours worked are correlated even when the CEO is not
actually in o ce. Column 3 shows that this is not the case: the correlation between productivity
before the CEO appointment and his hours worked after being appointed is negative and not
precisely estimated.21
A second concern is that the correlation between hours worked and productivity is driven by
measurement error in the time use data. For instance, more productive ﬁrms might hire more
talented PAs who keep a more complete record of the CEOs’ activities, thus creating a spurious
correlation between hours recorded and productivity, while the underlying correlation between
hours worked and productivity is zero. To test the practical relevance of this concern, in Column
4 we regress productivity on hours devoted to travel. Intuitively, if the correlation due to PAs in
more productive ﬁrms recording hours more carefully, non-work activities should also be positively
correlated with productivity. The ﬁndings in Column 4 allay this concern: the correlation between
productivity and time spent traveling is zero.
A question of interest is whether the advantages of having a hard working CEO are competed away,
namely if CEOs capture the entire surplus they generate by working longer hours. To shed light
on this issue, we test whether time use is correlated to ﬁrm proﬁtability. Columns 5 and 6 estimate
equation 6 using two measures of ﬁrm proﬁtability: the return on capital employed (ROCE) and
Tobin’s q. Our measure of hours worked is positively correlated with both. The magnitude of the
estimates implies that an increase in hours worked equal to the di↵erence between professional and
family CEOs is associated with an increase in ROCE (Tobin’s q) of 3% (5%) of the sample mean.
Finally, column 7 shows that hours worked are also associated with faster sales growth: an increase
in hours worked equal to the di↵erence between professional and family CEOs is associated with
.003 (7.5% of the sample mean) faster sales growth over one year.
The positive correlation between CEO hour worked and ﬁrm performance, coupled with the fact
that family CEOs prefer to lead their ﬁrms even when delegation to professional managers is feasible,
suggests that family CEO might enjoy non-monetary beneﬁts of control (Demsetz and Lehn 1985,
Bandiera et al 2013).
21This is not driven by sample composition. The correlation between productivity and hours after the CEO
appointment is the same for this group of ﬁrms as for the larger sample when we condition the sample on years in
which the CEO is in o ce.
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The evidence presented in this paper paints a consistent picture of the di↵erence in behavior between
family and professional CEOs. Family CEOs tend to work fewer hours relative to professional
managers. The di↵erence between the two types of managers is smaller when the opportunity cost
of leisure is larger, and when the marginal cost of e↵ort is smaller. These patterns can be accounted
for by a di↵erence in the preferences of family and professional CEOs, with the former placing a
higher relative weight on leisure, presumably due to wealth e↵ects. To provide support to this idea,
we show that the di↵erences in hours worked between family and professional CEOs are greater
where inheritance laws favor wealth concentration.
The data also reveals a strong correlation between CEO hours and ﬁrm performance. While no
causal inference can be made, combining this correlation with the di↵erence in hours worked trans-
lates into a 6% productivity di↵erence between family and professional CEOs. The behavioral
di↵erence is hence a potential candidate to account for at least some of the performance di↵erential
between family and non-family ﬁrms documented in the literature (Morck et al 2000, Villalonga
and Amit 2006, Perez-Gonzalez 2006, Bennedsen et al. 2007, Bertrand et al 2008, Bertrand 20).
More generally, the evidence presented here highlights the importance of how corporate leaders
allocate their limited attention. Attention is a scarce resource, particularly so at the top of the
organization. The allocation of time reﬂects the allocation of attention, which in turns depends on
the strategic priorities of the CEO. The importance for e↵ective corporate leaders of aligning their
own time management to their goals has been a cornerstone of leadership theories for many years
(Drucker 1966). According to Simon (1976), “attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational
activity, and the bottleneck becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of organiza-
tions.” Attention constraints at the top feature prominently in economic models of organizational
hierarchies, which study how managers should allocate this resource optimally. This study doc-
uments di↵erences in attention allocation at the top, but does not identify the channel through
which they may a↵ect ﬁrm performance. Halac and Prat (2014) model the e↵ects of attention
misallocation on the quality of management and the engagement of the workforce. Future research
should investigate this and other possible channels for this e↵ect.
Finally, the ﬁnding that family CEOs put less e↵ort than professional CEOs because of a wealth
e↵ect raises a public ﬁnance question. Would an increase in taxation that a↵ects the owners of
family ﬁrms bring about an increase in productive e ciency? Such taxation might include an
inheritance tax, a wealth tax, or a reduction in the various forms of exemptions that family ﬁrms
enjoy in many parts of the world. Our evidence that inheritance laws are strongly correlated with
the hours worked by family CEOs is a case in point.
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Notes: The graph shows the histogram of total weekly hours worked (built from
actual9diary9data)9by9a9sample9of911149CEOs.
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Notes: The graph shows the histogram of total weekly hours worked (CEO
estimates recorded at the end of the data collection week) by a sample of 758
CEOsA(allACEOsAinAsampleAexcludingAIndia,AwhereAtheArecallAquestionAwasAnotAasked).
Notes: The graph shows the linear regression of total weekly hours worked (CEO
estimates recorded at the end of the data collection week)and actual hours
worked (built from diary data) for a sample of 758 CEOs (all CEOs in sample
excludingAIndia,AwhereAtheArecallAquestionAwasAnotAasked).
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Family CEOs Professional CEOs
WeeklyChoursCworkedCHCDiaryCmeasureCTable&1&(&Summary&Statistics&(means,&standard&deviation&in&parentheses&except&for&column&4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel&A.&Use&of&Time All Family&CEOs Professional&CEOs Difference&(3)((2)
(T(statistic)
Total&weekly&hours&worked&(&recall&measure 51.719 49.147 52.749 3.602***
(10.105) (10.727) (9.665) (4.46)
Total&weekly&hours&worked&(&diary&measure 52.009 48.378 54.543 6.165***
(11.026) (10.504) (10.674) (9.55)///
Total&weekly&hours&worked&excluding&activities&<&15&mins,&personal&&&travel 41.439 37.415 44.249 6.834***
(10.035) (9.740) (9.258) (11.87)///
Number&of&days&at&work 5.356 5.303 5.393 0.0898*//
(0.695) (0.639) (0.729) (2.13)///
Beginning&of&work&day&(hour) 8.826 9.260 8.524 00.736***
(1.161) (1.213) (1.019) (010.96)///
End&of&work&day&(hour) 18.270 18.239 18.291 0.0511///
(1.566) (1.383) (1.682) (0.54)///
Share&of&time&spent&in&personal&activities 0.101 0.123 0.086 00.0379***
(0.099) (0.113) (0.084) (06.42)///
Panel&B.&CEO&characteristics
Age 50.930 50.562 51.187 0.625///
(8.458) (9.738) (7.425) (1.21)///
Male&(=1&if&CEO&is&male) 0.961 0.950 0.970 0.0197///
(0.193) (0.219) (0.172) (1.68)///
College&degree&(=1&if&CEO&has&a&college&degree) 0.925 0.904 0.939 0.0351*//
(0.264) (0.295) (0.239) (2.19)///
MBA&(=1&if&CEO&has&been&awarded&an&MBA) 0.548 0.430 0.631 0.201***
(0.498) (0.496) (0.483) (6.76)///
Tenure&as&CEO&&(number&of&years) 10.298 15.586 6.602 08.984***
(9.550) (10.514) (6.677) (017.40)///
Tenure&in&firm&(number&of&years) 17.116 22.862 13.119 09.742***
(11.597) (10.497) (10.611) (015.11)///
Experience&abroad&(=1&if&CEO&has&had&worked&experience&abroad) 0.482 0.393 0.544 0.151***
(0.500) (0.489) (0.498) (5.02)///
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms&(=1&if&CEO&hold&managerial&positions&in&other&firms) 0.418 0.456 0.392 00.0646*//
(0.494) (0.499) (0.489) (02.15)///
Panel&C.&Firm&characteristics
Domestic&or&Foreign&Multinational&(=1&if&firm&is&owned&by&a&foreign&or&domestic&MNE) 0.242 0.188 0.280 0.0927***
(0.429) (0.391) (0.450) (3.57)///
Number&of&Employees 1571.051 1036.575 1945.432 908.9///
(10127.428) (3660.922) (12837.271) (1.47)///
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 7.775 7.389 8.044 0.656**/
(3.774) (3.979) (3.604) (2.86)///
COO&(=1&if&COO&exists) 0.259 0.177 0.317 0.140***
(0.439) (0.382) (0.466) (5.32)///
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions 0.103 0.245 0.005 00.240***
(0.304) (0.430) (0.068) (014.04)///
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions 0.043 0.096 0.006 00.0900***
(0.203) (0.295) (0.078) (07.45)///
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant 0.428 0.373 0.466 0.0931**/
(0.495) (0.484) (0.499) (3.10)///
Panel&D.&External&Environment
Located&in&emerging&economies&(=1&if&India&or&Brazil) 0.573 0.779 0.428 00.351***
(0.495) (0.415) (0.495) (012.43)
Lerner&Index 1.227 1.225 1.229 0.00337///
(0.412) (0.419) (0.408) (0.13)///
Import&Penetration 0.614 0.638 0.597 00.0406///
(0.566) (0.623) (0.523) (01.12)///
Number&of&Observations 1114 458 656
Notes: The table shows summary statistics (means, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 103; differences and t0statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO time
use, CEO characteristics, firm and industry level data for the sample CEOs. Family CEOs are those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm. All
variables in Panel A, B and C collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration = ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging
OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner index of
competition = (10profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit SIC industry computed , as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging firm level data in ORBIS relative to the 200802012 time
period/across/Brazil,/France,/Germany,/India,/US/and/UK//at/the/industry/level.Table&2&(&Family&vs.&Professional&CEOs&(&Cross&sectional&differences&in&Hours&Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent&Variable ln(Hours&
Worked)&(&
Recall&
measure
Family&CEO !0.180*** !0.113*** !0.110*** !0.104*** !0.088*** !0.088*** !0.082*** !0.051**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Family&Ownership,&External&CEO 0.020
(0.018)
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.015 0.010 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Ln(CEO&age) !0.157*** !0.170*** !0.127*** !0.129*** !0.131*** !0.014
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.049)
Ln(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.003 !0.007 !0.006 !0.005 !0.005 !0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
CEO&holds&College&degree 0.056* 0.051* 0.049* 0.063** 0.062** 0.035
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
CEO&holds&MBA&degree 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.025
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
CEO&has&study/work&experience&abroad 0.022 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Ln(Employment) 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Ln(Firm&age) 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.000 !0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
MNE 0.022 0.018 0.025 0.025 0.016
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
COO&exists !0.006 !0.016 !0.015 0.008
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions !0.045** !0.057*** !0.056*** !0.022
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031)
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions !0.016 !0.024 !0.024 0.035
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035)
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant !0.001 !0.000 0.039**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Constant 3.767*** 3.587*** 4.098*** 4.005*** 3.783*** 3.799*** 3.811*** 3.875***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.169) (0.168) (0.177) (0.184) (0.184) (0.215)
R(squared 0.118 0.209 0.223 0.237 0.250 0.345 0.345 0.212
Number&of&firms 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 748
Country&dummies n y y y y y y y
Industry&dummies n n y y y y y y
Noise&controls n n n n n y y y
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust standard errors in parenthesis). The variable "CEO
Hours Worked" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. The
variable "CEO Hours Worked ! Recall Measure" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities as recalled by the CEO at the end of the survey
week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes.
Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally
report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy
toZdenoteZweeksZwithZaZnationalZorZreligiousZholiday.
ln(Hours&Worked)&(Diary&MeasureTable&3&(&Difference&in&difference&estimates&I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent&Variable
Family&CEO !0.267*** !0.252*** !0.165*** !0.123***
(0.074) (0.086) (0.043) (0.030)
Ln(Employment) 0.012 0.016* 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Family&CEO*ln(Employment) 0.029**
(0.011)
ln(Sales) 0.004
(0.007)
Family&CEO*ln(Sales) 0.016**
(0.008)
Lerner&index 0.027
(0.017)
Family&CEO*Lerner&index 0.058**
(0.026)
Family&CEO*Import&Penetration&(OECD) 0.045**
(0.018)
Constant 3.755*** 3.657*** 3.712*** 3.860***
(0.235) (0.215) (0.189) (0.129)
R(squared 0.349 0.357 0.350 0.276
Number&of&firms 1107 912 1020 1006
Country&dummies y y y y
Industry&dummies y y y y
CEO&characteristics y y y y
Firm&characteristics& y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y
ln(Hours&Worked)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. In all columns robust standard errors
under coefficient, except for columns 6, 7 and 8 (clustered by 3 digits SIC codes). The variable "CEO Hours Worked" is the log of the total
hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week. Family CEO=1 for those
who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. CEO&
characteristics are a dummy to denote CEOs holding a managerial or board position in another firm, the log of CEO age, the log of one plus
number of years CEO has been employed in the firm, a dummy to denote CEOs holding a college degree, a dummy to denote CEOs holding an
MBA or equivalent degree, a dummy to denote CEO that have worked or studied abroad. Firm characteristics are the log of one plus firm
age, a dummy to denote foreign or domestic multinationals, the number of people reporting directly to the CEO, a dummy to denote
whether the firm employs a COO, the number of CEO's sons and daughters holding a managerial position in the same firm. Noise controls
include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time use data was recorded by the CEO's Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer dummies; a
dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to
rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with a national or religious holiday. Import penetration =
ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last
available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner index of competition = (1!profit/sales) in the
firm 3 digit SIC industry computed , as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging firm level data in ORBIS relative to the 2008!2012 time period
acrossfBrazil,fFrance,fGermany,fIndia,fUSfandfUKffatfthefindustryflevel.Table&4&(&Difference&in&difference&estimates&II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent&Variable
ln(1+Hours&
Before&3PM)
ln(1+Hours&
After&3PM)
Family&CEO !0.070*** !0.031 !0.077*** !0.074*** !0.083** 0.022
(0.024) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.039)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain !0.023 0.033
(0.019) (0.025)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&Family&CEO !0.083**
(0.033)
Cricket&game !0.058** !0.027 0.074* !0.090**
(0.025) (0.019) (0.040) (0.039)
Cricket&game&*Family&CEO !0.049 !0.120** !0.044
(0.048) (0.048) (0.080)
Constant 2.018*** 1.989*** 2.268*** 2.271*** 1.527*** 0.559
(0.288) (0.287) (0.256) (0.256) (0.382) (0.414)
R(squared 0.189 0.193 0.176 0.176 0.096 0.093
Observations 1603 1603 1832 1832 1832 1832
Number&of&firms 349 349 349 349 349 349
Industry&dummies y y y y y y
CEO&characteristics y y y y y y
Firm&characteristics y y y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y y y
Test&Rain+Family&CEO*Rain=0&(p(value) 0.04
Test&Cricket+Family&CEO*Cricket=0&(p(value) 0.12 0.01 0.07
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table is based on day level data collected from CEOs in India. All columns
estimated by OLS. Standard errors under coefficient are clustered by firm in columns 1 and 2, and by firm and date in columns 3 to 6. The variable "CEO
Hours Worked" is the log of 1 plus the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey day.
Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. "Extreme Rain" is a dummy denoting intense rainfall
(relative to the non Monsoon period) in the area and day where the CEO is located (data measured by the closest weather station, matched to the zipcode
of the CEO activities for the day). "Cricket game" is a dummy denoting that an Indian Premier League playoff, semifinal or final game was played and
broadcasted on television on the day. Industry dummies are 19 two digits SIC codes. Firm characteristics are the log of one plus firm age, a dummy to
denote foreign or domestic multinationals, the number of people reporting directly to the CEO, a dummy to denote whether the firm employs a COO, the
number of CEO's sons and daughters holding a managerial position in the same firm. CEO characteristics are a dummy to denote CEOs holding a managerial
or board position in another firm, the log of CEO age, the log of one plus number of years CEO has been employed in the firm, a dummy to denote CEOs
holding a college degree, a dummy to denote CEOs holding an MBA or equivalent degree, a dummy to denote CEO that have worked or studied abroad.
Noise controls include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time use data was recorded by the CEO's Personal Assistant; 15 interviewer dummies; a
dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 7 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the
representativeness`of`the`week`and`a`dummy`to`denote`weeks`with`a`national`or`religious`holiday.
ln(1+&Hours&Worked)&(&Day&Level&Table&5(&Wealth&Concentration,&Development&and&Contract&Enforcement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent&Variable
Family&CEO !0.093*** !0.089*** !0.089*** !0.087*** !0.090***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Family&CEO*Max&%&of&inheritable&wealth,&
country !0.229** !0.399*
(0.118) (0.208)
ln(GDP),&region& 0.043 0.020
(0.031) (0.034)
Family&CEO*ln(GDP),&region& !0.018 0.030
(0.019) (0.048)
Family&CEO*Rule&of&Law,&country !0.008 0.008
(0.025) (0.062)
Trust,&region !0.171 !0.144
(0.174) (0.194)
Family&CEO*Trust,&region& 0.074 0.066
(0.121) (0.214)
R(squared 0.349 0.346 0.345 0.345 0.349
Observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
Country&dummies y y y y y
Industry&dummies y y y y y
CEO&characteristics y y y y y
Firm&characteristics& y y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y y
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. In all columns standard errors
under coefficient are clustered by country (wild cluster bootstrap, Webb 6 point distribution). The variable "CEO Hours Worked" is
the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey
week. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummiesY
are 33 two digits SIC codes. CEO characteristics are a dummy to denote CEOs holding a managerial or board position in another
firm, the log of CEO age, the log of one plus number of years CEO has been employed in the firm, a dummy to denote CEOs holding
a college degree, a dummy to denote CEOs holding an MBA or equivalent degree, a dummy to denote CEO that have worked or
studied abroad. Firm characteristics are the log of one plus firm age, a dummy to denote foreign or domestic multinationals, the
number of people reporting directly to the CEO, a dummy to denote whether the firm employs a COO, the number of CEO's sons
and daughters holding a managerial position in the same firm. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time
use data was recorded by the CEO's Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to
an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the
week and a dummy to denote weeks with a national or religious holiday. The variable "Max % of inheritable wealth" is a country
specific measure taken from Ellul et al (2010) for all countries, except for India where the measure is set to 0.50 to take into
account the fact that the vast majority of family firms in our sample are organized as Hindu Undivided Family organizations (see
main text for more details). The variables ln(GDP), region" and "Rule of Law, country" are taken from Gennaioli et al (2013). The
variable "Trust, region"is computed using respondent level data from the World Values Survey and measures the % of people
responding "Yes" to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
carefulYinYdealingYwithYpeople?”.Table&6&(&CEO&Hours&Worked&and&Firm&Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent&Variable Profitability&
(ROCE,&%)
Tobin's&q Growth&(Sales,&
1&year,&%)
CEO&in&office CEO&in&office
CEO&not&in&
office
CEO&in&office CEO&in&office CEO&in&office CEO&in&office
ln(Hours&Worked) 0.448** 0.364** (0.198 0.039* 0.580** 0.036**
(0.208) (0.155) (0.312) (0.022) (0.284) (0.016)
ln(1+Hours&Travel) 0.027
(0.036)
Ln(Employment) 0.973*** 0.478*** 0.664*** 0.484*** 0.003 0.193*** 0.002
(0.045) (0.063) (0.080) (0.062) (0.003) (0.058) (0.004)
Ln(Capital) 0.265*** 0.139*** 0.269***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.040)
ln(Materials) 0.410*** 0.388*** 0.412***
(0.034) (0.056) (0.035)
R(squared 0.537 0.755 0.835 0.754 0.171 0.264 0.212
Observations 2849 2849 868 2849 2080 1183 2199
Number&of&firms 909 909 357 912 493 298 780
Year*Country&dummies y y y y y y y
Industry*Country&dummies y y y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y y y
ln(Sales)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (standard errors under coefficient clustered by
firm). The variable "CEO Hours Worked" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding
travel) during the survey week. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 4 is the log sales; in column 5, Return on Capital Employed (ROCE); in column
6, 1 year sales growth; in column 7, Tobin's Q. Accounting data run between 2007 and 2013. Each column includes a full set of country and year
dummies. We include only years in which the CEO was in office in all columns except for column 4, and allow for a maximum of three years of
accounts for each firm (3 most recent years with non missing data in ORBIS). In column 4 we include only years in which the CEO was not in office. In
columns 3(6 materials and capital are set to (99 if not available, and a dummy to denote this is included as additional control in the regression. Noise&
controls include: a dummy to denote case in which the time use data was recorded by the CEO's Personal Assistant; 55 interviewer dummies; a
dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the
representativeness\of\the\week\and\a\dummy\to\denote\weeks\with\a\national\or\religious\holiday.A Data Appendix
A.1 The Time Use Survey
A.1.1 Survey Management
The time use survey took place in two stages: in the Spring of 2011 a team of 15 analysts based
in Mumbai and led by one of our project managers collected data on India, while the rest of the
countries were covered in a second survey wave in the Spring of 2013 by a team of 40 enumerators
based at the London School of Economics. To ensure comparability, we adopted the same protocol
and retained the same project manager across both waves. The enumerators where typically grad-
uate students (often MBAs) recruited speciﬁcally for this project. All enumerators were subject
to a common intensive training on the survey methodology for three days at the beginning of the
project, plus weekly team progress reviews and one to one conversations with their supervisors to
discuss possible uncertainties with respect to the classiﬁcation of the time use data. Each interview
was checked o↵ at the end of the week by one supervisor, who would make sure that the data was
complete in every ﬁeld, and that the enumerator had codiﬁed all the activities according to the
survey protocol. Each enumerator ran on average 30 interviews.
Each enumerator was allocated a random list of about 120 companies, and was in charge of calling
up the numbers of his or her list to convince the CEO to participate in the survey, and to collect
the time use data in the week allocated to the CEO. One project manager, ﬁve full time supervisors
and one additional manager working on a part time basis led the survey team.
We actively monitored and coached the enumerators throughout the project, which intensiﬁed
their persistence in chasing the CEOs and getting them to participate. We also o↵ered the CEOs
a personalized analysis of their use of time (which was sent to them in January 2012 to the Indian
CEOs and in June 2014 to the rest of the countries) to give them the ability to monitor their time
allocation, and compare it with peers in the industry.
A.1.2 Sampling Frame
The sampling frame was drawn from ORBIS, an extensive commercial data set that contains
company accounts for several millions of companies around the world. Our sampling criteria were
as follows. First, we restricted the sample to manufacturing and additionally kept ﬁrms that were
classiﬁed as “active” in the year prior to the survey (2010 in India and 2012 for the other countries)
and with available recent accounting data.22These conditions restricted our sample to 11,500 ﬁrms.
Second, we further restricted the sample to companies for which we could ﬁnd CEOs contact details.
To gather contact information we hired a team of research assistants based in Mumbai, London and
22For the Indian sample, we also restricted the sample to ﬁrms headquartered in the ﬁfteen main Indian states.
This excluded ﬁrms located in Assam, Bihar, Chandigarh, Chhattisgarh, Dadra, Daman and Diu, Goa, Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Orissa and Uttarakhand, each of which accounts for less than 3% of
Indian GDP.
27Boston who veriﬁed the CEOs names and found their phone numbers and emails. This restricted
the sample to 7,744 ﬁrms. Of these, 907 later resulted not to be eligible for the interviews upon the
ﬁrst telephonic contact (the reasons for non eligibility included recent bankruptcy or the company
not being in manufacturing), and 310 were never contacted because the project ended before this
was possible. The ﬁnal number of eligible companies was thus 6,527, with median yearly sales of
$53,000,000. Of these, we were able to secure an interview with 1,131 CEOs, although 17 CEOs
dropped out before the end of the data collection week for personal reasons and were thus removed
from the sample before the analysis was conducted.
The selection analysis in Table A1 shows that ﬁrms in the ﬁnal sample have on average slightly
lower log sales relative to the sampling frame (coe cient 0.071, standard error 0.011). However,
we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant selection e↵ect on performance variables, such as labor productivity
(sales over employees) and return on capital employed (ROCE).
A.2 Firm Data
A.2.1 Accounts
The data on sales, employment, capital, materials, proﬁts, return on capital employed, market
values came from ORBIS.23 In the regressions shown in Table 6, columns 1, 2 and 4-8 we restrict
the sample to the three most recent years in the interval running from 2007 to 2011 in India and
2008 to 2012 for the rest of the sample, and use only years in which the CEO was in o ce. The
summary statistics for this sample are shown in Table A7.
A.2.2 Ownership
Ownership data is collected in interviews with the CEOs and independently checked using several
Internet sources (e.g. The Economic Times of India, Bloomberg, etc.), information provided on
the company website and supplemental phone interviews. We deﬁne a ﬁrm to be owned by an
entity if this controls more than 25.01% of the shares; if no single entity owns at least 25.01% of
the share the ﬁrm is labeled as “Dispersed shareholder”. Family ﬁrms are deﬁned as those where
a family (combined across all family members, all second generation relative to the founder or
beyond) are the largest shareholders. Founder ﬁrms are deﬁned as those where the original founder
of the company is the largest shareholder. For both family 2nd generation and founder ﬁrms, we
distinguish between cases in which a family ﬁrm or the founder are also CEOs of the company, in
contrast to cases in which a professional manager (i.e. a person not a liated with the founder or
the family) has been nominated CEO. In the analysis we combine founder CEO and family, 2nd
generation CEOs in a single category (41% of the sample). The omitted category in all regressions
includes family or founder owned ﬁrms with professional CEOs (16.2%), dispersed shareholders
23The main exception is India, where employment ﬁgures are typically not published in the public accounts.
Therefore, we gathered this information from the survey questionnaire.
28(22.5%), government (0.8%), private equity/venture capital (7.5%), private individuals who are
not founders or heirs to the founders of the company (9.3%). In 2.7% of the sample, the ﬁrm was
owned by joint venture with equal split of the ownership shares.
A.3 Industry Data
Our industry classiﬁcation is the US SIC (1987). Each ﬁrm is allocated to each main two digit
sector based on sales. We have 32 distinct two digit industries, and at least two companies for all
of these industries except 4 (0.4% of the sample of ﬁrms).
The Lerner index of competition is constructed following Aghion et al. (2005) as the mean of
(1-proﬁt/sales) in the entire database excluding the ﬁrm itself for every three digit SIC industry,
using accounting data relative to the six countries in our sample (data averaged between 2006 and
2010 for India and between 2008 and 2012 for the rest of the countries).
The import competition measure is built as real industry imports divided by industry sales, using
STAN data produced by the OECD. The measure is obtained by taking averages across all countries
in our sample for which the industry measures were available (France, Germany, UK and US). The
years used to build this measures are 2006 to 2008, i.e. the latest years for which the data was
produced using the ISIC REV3 classiﬁcation (the coverage of the countries included in our sample
declines dramatically in the data produced using the ISIC REV4 classiﬁcation).
A.4 Shocks
A.4.1 Monsoons
The climate data was extracted on 12/08/2011 from http://www7.ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/cdodata.cmd.
The data was merged with station coordinates (latitude and longitude), and these were in turn used
to merge the data with the time use dataset using the date and zipcode of each of the activities
recorded in the data (data matched with the closest station, distance computed by generating the
vertical and horizontal distance using the latitude and longitude points and applying Pythagoras).
The deﬁnition of days of intense rain is based on the comparison of the daily rainfall precipita-
tion with the average precipitation in the pre-Monsoon month of May for the same station. We
ﬁrst compute a variable measuring for each day between June 1st and July 31st the change in
precipitation relative to the average May values for the same station. We then deﬁne a variable
“Extreme Rain” which takes value one if the change in rainfall lies in the third tercile of the overall
distribution computed using data across all stations in the sample.
The measure can be constructed for 350 CEOs in the sample. About 45% of the sample includes
days of extreme rain (standard deviation is .49). 253 CEOs in the sample (159 Family CEOs and
94 professional CEOs) have at least one day of extreme rain during the sample week. 289 CEOs in
the sample (194 Family CEOs and 95 professional CEOs) have at least one day of non-extreme rain
29during the sample week. 192 CEOs in the sample (118 Family CEOs and 74 professional CEOs)
have at least one day of extreme rain and one day of non-extreme rain during the sample week.
A.4.2 Cricket Games
We use data on the 2011 Indian Premier League (IPL) Cricket tournament. We focus on four
games: two playo↵s (Royal Challengers vs. Chennai Super Kings, played on 5/25/2011) and
Mumbai Indians vs. Kolkata Knight Riders, played on 5/25/2011), one semi-ﬁnal for the 3rd and
4th place (Royal Challengers vs. Mumbai Indians, played on 5/27/2011) and the ﬁnal (Chennai
Super Kings vs. Royal Challengers (played on 5/28/2011).
Since we surveyed multiple CEOs within the same day, the sample includes 88 CEO-days with a
cricket game (the mean of the cricket dummy is 0.048, standard deviation is 0.21). Overall, we
have 28 CEOs which were exposed to the cricket game during the survey week. Of these, 18 are
family CEOs and the rest are professional CEOs.
A.5 Country and Region Data
Data on cross country di↵erences in inheritance laws is drawn from Ellul et al (2010). The variable
“Max % of inheritable wealth” used in Table 5 measures the largest share of the estate that in
each country a testator can bequeath to a single child in presence of a surviving spouse and two
siblings (Ellul et al show that the median number of children of ﬁrm owners is estimated to be two
across almost all countries where this could be calculated). We use the measure published on Table
1, column 4 of the paper for all countries except for India. The measure proposed for India by
Ellul et al is based on the Indian Succession Act, which applies to all non Hindu and non Muslim
citizens. Since the vast majority (81%) of the Indian family ﬁrms in our sample are organized as
Hindu United Family (HUF) organizations, we refer instead to the Hindu Succession Act (1956)
which stipulates that the head of a HUF family ﬁrm must bequeath his share of the ﬁrm in equal
parts to all members of the HUF. Since there must be at least two members in a HUF and we do
not know the number of family members, we take 0.5 to be the upper bound of the inheritance
share. Results are robust to assuming there are three surviving members hence the maximal share
is 0.33.
The Rule of Law measure captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Estimate gives the
country’s score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. ranging
from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. and is drawn from the Kau↵man et al (2010).
Data on regional GDP per capita is drawn from Gennaioli et al (2103). The measure is expressed
in PPP constant 2005 international dollars.
Data on regional trust has been calculated from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS
is a cross-country project coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the University of
30Michigan. Each wave carries out representative surveys of the basic values and beliefs of individuals
in a large cross-section of countries. The questionnaire contains answers to speciﬁc questions
about religion and social attitudes, including several question on generalized and speciﬁc trust (e.g.
trust in the family, government etc.), as well as detailed information on the social and education
background of the respondents (age, income, and education). The key question we use is the
standard one: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. The WVS data can be downloaded from the WVS
website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). For the purposes of our analysis, we pool together four
successive waves of data collection (1981–1984, 1989–1993, 1994–1999 and 1999–2004), and we use
only individual entries with information on the respondents’ region of residence. We compute the
regional level of trust by taking the simple average over all observations available for the region
across all WVS waves (see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012 for further details).
31Figure'A1'*'Survey'screenshotTable&A1&)&&Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All All All
Dependent&Variable
Country=Brazil 0.677*** 0.695*** 0.655*** 0.559*
(0.074) (0.075) (0.079) (0.288)
Country=France 0.210*** 0.256*** 0.143 0.562**
(0.073) (0.074) (0.104) (0.221)
Country=Germany 0.115 0.194** 0.152* 0.476**
(0.072) (0.078) (0.082) (0.222)
Country=India 0.658*** 0.699** 1.227*** 0.672
(0.247) (0.272) (0.371) (0.425)
Country=UK /0.178** /0.139* /0.153** 0.088
(0.074) (0.074) (0.077) (0.218)
Ln(Sales) /0.071***
(0.011)
ln(Sales/Employees) /0.018
(0.030)
ROCE 0.000
(0.001)
Number&of&firms 6256 5993 4090 3492
Dummy=1&if&CEO&participated
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by probit (marginal
effects reported, robust standard errors under coefficient). The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy=1 if
the CEO participated in the survey. The selection regression is run on the latest available year of accounting data.
AllOcolumnsOincludeO2OdigitsOSICOindustryOdummies.Table&A2&)&Summary&Statistics&by&Country&(means)
Brazil France Germany India UK US Total
Panel&A.&Time&use
Total&weekly&hours&worked&)&recall&measure 50.26 50.81 52.11 n.a.. 52.08 54.97 51.72
Total&weekly&hours&worked&)&diary&measure 52.60 58.30 55.88 46.27 54.40 55.09 52.01
Total&weekly&hours&worked&excluding&activities&<&15&mins,&personal&&&travel 40.80 47.02 46.69 35.94 44.31 45.41 41.44
Number&of&days&at&work 5.29 5.21 5.54 5.25 5.52 5.61 5.36
Beginning&of&work&day&(hour) 8.51 8.19 8.58 9.80 8.45 8.03 8.83
End&of&work&day&(hours) 18.13 18.92 18.19 18.57 17.89 17.60 18.27
Share&of&time&spent&in&personal&activities 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.10
Panel&B.&CEO&characteristics
Age 51.90 49.53 49.26 50.61 49.02 53.47 50.93
Male 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.96
College&degree 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.84 0.91 0.92
MBA 0.63 0.60 0.85 0.41 0.47 0.48 0.55
Tenure&as&CEO& 11.39 7.12 7.85 12.82 7.00 8.57 10.30
Tenure&in&firm 19.34 12.29 14.98 19.11 14.16 15.29 17.12
Experience&abroad 0.55 0.56 0.69 0.33 0.59 0.42 0.48
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.34 0.35 0.58 0.47 0.40 0.38 0.42
Panel&C.&Firm&Characteristics
Domestic&or&Foreign&Multinational 0.17 0.24 0.48 0.17 0.32 0.32 0.24
Number&of&Employees 1185.64 730.21 4942.14 1224.86 486.78 1559.61 1571.05
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 6.60 8.54 9.50 7.79 7.93 7.85 7.77
COO 0.19 0.19 0.42 0.05 0.74 0.54 0.26
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.10
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.04
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant 0.56 0.40 0.58 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.43
%&of&Family&Firms 0.41 0.14 0.31 0.67 0.17 0.21 0.41
Panel&D.&Industry&Characteristics
Lerner&Index 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.34 1.16 1.16 1.23
Import&Penetration 0.63 0.56 0.66 0.66 0.48 0.58 0.61
ln(GDP&per&Capita),&region 9.22 10.30 10.36 8.03 10.39 10.65 9.36
Rule&of&Law,&country .0.29 1.41 1.64 0.09 1.67 1.55 0.62
Trust,&region 0.06 0.22 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.42 0.28
Max&%&Inheritance,&country 0.67 0.66 0.67 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.68
Notes: The table shows summary statistics (means, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 1.3; differences and t.statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO time
use, CEO characteristics, firm and industry level data for a sample of 1114 CEOs in Brazil (N=282), France (N=115), Germany (N=125), India (N=356), UK (N=87) and US
(N=149). All variables in Panel A, B and C collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration = ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by
averaging OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner
index of competition = (1.profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit SIC industry computed , as in Aghion et al. (2005), by averaging firm level data in ORBIS relative to the 2008.2012
time^period^across^Brazil,^France,^Germany,^India,^US^and^UK^^at^the^industry^level.Table&A3&)&Family&vs.&Professional&CEOs&)&Additional&Robustness&Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experiment Baseline Levels Negative&
binomial
Adding&
country*industry&
interactions
Restrincting&
sample&to&Brazil&&&
India
Restricting&sample&
to&France,&
Germany,&UK&and&
US
First&survey&wave&
(India&only)
Second&survey&
wave&(Brazil,&
France,&Germany,&
UK&and&US)
Dependent&Variable ln(Hours&
Worked)
Hours&Worked Hours&Worked
ln(Hours&
Worked)
ln(Hours&Worked) ln(Hours&Worked) ln(Hours&Worked) ln(Hours&Worked)
Family&CEO !0.088*** !3.164*** !0.077*** !0.087*** !0.083*** !0.082** !0.063** !0.096***
(0.019) (0.742) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.036) (0.030) (0.025)
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.008 0.025 0.004 0.014 0.026 0.000 0.044* !0.006
(0.015) (0.560) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.026) (0.024) (0.020)
Ln(CEO&age) !0.129*** !4.696*** !0.119*** !0.143*** !0.151*** !0.087 !0.173** !0.109**
(0.041) (1.651) (0.037) (0.045) (0.052) (0.071) (0.069) (0.054)
Ln(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.005 !0.129 !0.006 !0.006 0.001 !0.008 !0.005 0.001
(0.010) (0.380) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012)
CEO&holds&College&degree 0.063** 2.525** 0.054** 0.054* 0.062 0.028 0.059 0.055
(0.029) (1.045) (0.024) (0.033) (0.038) (0.043) (0.050) (0.033)
CEO&holds&MBA&degree 0.011 0.532 0.012 0.006 !0.017 0.030 0.012 0.011
(0.016) (0.618) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021)
CEO&has&study/work&experience&abroad 0.002 0.225 0.006 !0.003 0.013 !0.016 !0.018 0.011
(0.016) (0.605) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.025) (0.030) (0.020)
Ln(Employment) 0.023*** 0.870*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.013 0.028*** 0.021**
(0.007) (0.269) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
Ln(Firm&age) 0.001 0.031 0.005 0.003 0.003 !0.001 !0.025 0.007
(0.009) (0.382) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.023) (0.011)
MNE 0.025 0.939 0.021 0.033* 0.042* 0.025 0.071* 0.008
(0.018) (0.710) (0.015) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.037) (0.021)
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 0.007*** 0.286*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.009** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.099) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
COO&exists !0.016 !0.562 !0.012 !0.018 !0.042 0.011 !0.017 !0.010
(0.018) (0.737) (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.055) (0.019)
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions !0.057*** !1.877** !0.048** !0.061*** !0.047** !0.153** !0.022 !0.175***
(0.021) (0.730) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.059) (0.024) (0.045)
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions !0.024 !1.210 !0.029 !0.013 !0.034 !0.013 !0.039 0.015
(0.027) (0.955) (0.024) (0.029) (0.032) (0.069) (0.038) (0.038)
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant !0.001 !0.120 !0.005 !0.001 !0.007 0.006 0.009 !0.002
(0.016) (0.638) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.020)
Constant 3.799*** 45.258*** 3.801*** 4.021*** 3.616*** 3.682*** 3.418*** 3.771***
(0.184) (7.453) (0.166) (0.371) (0.251) (0.316) (0.325) (0.220)
R)squared 0.345 0.352 0.348 0.345 0.143 0.250 0.263
Number&of&firms 1114 1114 1114 1114 638 476 356 758
Country&dummies y y y y y y y y
Industry&dummies y y y y y y y y
Country*Industry&dummies n n n y n n n n
Noise&controls y y y y y y y y
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust standard errors in parenthesis), except for column 3, estimated using a negative binomial
regression. The dependent variable is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel) during the survey week in columns 1 and 4!6, while
the level of hours worked is used incolumns 2 and 3. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC
codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29
interviewUweekUdummy;UaUselfUreportedUscoreUgivenUbyUtheUCEOUtoUrankUtheUrepresentativenessUofUtheUweekUandUaUdummyUtoUdenoteUweeksUwithUaUnationalUorUreligiousUholiday.Table&A4&)&Summary&Statistics&(means,&standard&deviation&in&parentheses&except&for&columns&5)7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel&A.&Use&of&Time
All Founder&CEOs Family&CEOs&(2nd&
generation&
onwards)
Professional&CEOs Difference&(4))(2) Difference&(4))(3) Difference&(2))(3)
(T)statistic) (T)statistic) (T)statistic)
Total&weekly&hours&worked&)&recall&measure 51.719 49.371 49.038 52.749 3.711*** 3.378**, -0.333,,,
(10.105) (12.452) (9.826) (9.665) (4.07),,, (2.65),,, (-0.21),,,
Total&weekly&hours&worked&)&diary&measure 52.009 47.445 48.740 54.543 5.804*** 7.098*** 1.294,,,
(11.026) (10.714) (10.415) (10.674) (8.12),,, (6.88),,, (1.18),,,
Total&weekly&hours&worked&excluding&activities&<&15&mins,&personal&&&travel 41.439 35.805 38.039 44.249 6.210*** 8.444*** 2.234*,,
(10.035) (10.410) (9.410) (9.258) (9.88),,, (9.24),,, (2.21),,,
Number&of&days&at&work 5.356 5.211 5.339 5.393 0.0539,,, 0.182**, 0.128,,,
(0.695) (0.570) (0.662) (0.729) (1.13),,, (2.67),,, (1.94),,,
Beginning&of&work&day&(hour) 8.826 9.225 9.273 8.524 -0.749*** -0.701*** 0.0483,,,
(1.161) (1.271) (1.192) (1.019) (-10.28),,, (-6.82),,, (0.38),,,
End&of&work&day&(hours) 18.270 18.008 18.329 18.291 -0.0387,,, 0.283,,, 0.321*,,
(1.566) (1.713) (1.223) (1.682) (-0.37),,, (1.73),,, (2.24),,,
Share&of&time&spent&in&personal&activities 0.101 0.144 0.115 0.086 -0.0299*** -0.0585*** -0.0286*,,
(0.099) (0.121) (0.109) (0.084) (-4.76),,, (-6.67),,, (-2.44),,,
Panel&B.&CEO&characteristics
Age 50.930 55.367 48.693 51.187 2.494*** -4.180*** -6.674***
(8.458) (7.392) (9.908) (7.425) (4.42),,, (-5.83),,, (-6.91),,,
Male 0.961 0.984 0.936 0.970 0.0331*,, -0.0149,,, -0.0480*,,
(0.193) (0.125) (0.244) (0.172) (2.47),,, (-0.93),,, (-2.12),,,
College&degree 0.925 0.852 0.924 0.939 0.0148,,, 0.0875*** 0.0727*,,
(0.264) (0.357) (0.265) (0.239) (0.88),,, (3.45),,, (2.38),,,
MBA 0.548 0.297 0.482 0.631 0.149*** 0.334*** 0.185***
(0.498) (0.459) (0.500) (0.483) (4.53),,, (7.22),,, (3.63),,,
Tenure&as&CEO& 10.298 21.211 13.398 6.602 -6.796*** -14.61*** -7.813***
(9.550) (10.223) (9.802) (6.677) (-12.79),,, (-20.50),,, (-7.56),,,
Tenure&in&firm 17.116 24.320 22.291 13.119 -9.171*** -11.20*** -2.030,,,
(11.597) (9.928) (10.672) (10.611) (-12.74),,, (-11.03),,, (-1.86),,,
Experience&abroad 0.482 0.227 0.458 0.544 0.0866*,, 0.318*** 0.231***
(0.500) (0.420) (0.499) (0.498) (2.57),,, (6.76),,, (4.64),,,
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.418 0.445 0.461 0.392 -0.0688*,, -0.0535,,, 0.0153,,,
(0.494) (0.499) (0.499) (0.489) (-2.07),,, (-1.13),,, (0.29),,,
Panel&C.&Firm&characteristics
Domestic&or&Foreign&Multinational 0.242 0.109 0.218 0.280 0.0623*,, 0.171*** 0.109**,
(0.429) (0.313) (0.414) (0.450) (2.11),,, (4.11),,, (2.69),,,
Number&of&Employees 1571.051 633.701 1192.091 1945.432 753.3,,, 1311.7,,, 558.4,,,
(10127.428) (1165.430) (4240.615) (12837.271) (1.04),,, (1.15),,, (1.46),,,
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 7.775 6.594 7.697 8.044 0.347,,, 1.450*** 1.103**,
(3.774) (2.863) (4.299) (3.604) (1.34),,, (4.30),,, (2.68),,,
COO 0.259 0.180 0.176 0.317 0.141*** 0.137**, -0.00393,,,
(0.439) (0.385) (0.381) (0.466) (4.77),,, (3.13),,, (-0.10),,,
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions 0.103 0.438 0.170 0.005 -0.165*** -0.433*** -0.268***
(0.304) (0.498) (0.376) (0.068) (-10.91),,, (-21.34),,, (-6.22),,,
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions 0.043 0.156 0.073 0.006 -0.0666*** -0.150*** -0.0835**,
(0.203) (0.365) (0.260) (0.078) (-6.05),,, (-9.52),,, (-2.74),,,
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant 0.428 0.406 0.361 0.466 0.106**, 0.0602,,, -0.0456,,,
(0.495) (0.493) (0.481) (0.499) (3.18),,, (1.25),,, (-0.91),,,
Panel&D.&External&Environment
Located&in&emerging&economies&(=1&if&India&or&Brazil) 0.573 0.844 0.755 0.428 -0.326*** -0.415*** -0.0892*,,
(0.495) (0.365) (0.431) (0.495) (-10.18),,, (-9.02),,, (-2.07),,,
Lerner&Index 1.227 1.186 1.240 1.229 -0.0112,,, 0.0426,,, 0.0538,,,
(0.412) (0.322) (0.450) (0.408) (-0.38),,, (1.05),,, (1.16),,,
Import&Penetration 0.614 0.602 0.651 0.597 -0.0536,,, -0.00465,,, 0.0490,,,
(0.566) (0.632) (0.621) (0.523) (-1.36),,, (-0.08),,, (0.70),,,
Number&of&Observations 1114 128 330 656 986,,, 784,,, 458,,,
Notes: The table shows summary statistics (means, standard deviation in parentheses in columns 1-3; differences and t-statistic in parentheses in column 4) of CEO time use, CEO characteristics, firm and industry
level data for a sample of 1114 CEOs). All variables in Panel A, B and C collected in the CEO time use survey. Import penetration = ln(import/production) in the firm ISIC REV3 industry, computed by averaging
OECD STAN data relative to the 2006–2008 time period (last available year for all countries) across France, Germany, US and UK at the industry level. Lerner index of competition = (1-profit/sales) in the firm 3 digit
SIC,industry,computed,,,as,in,Aghion,et,al.,(2005),,by,averaging,firm,level,data,in,ORBIS,relative,to,the,2008-2012,time,period,across,Brazil,,France,,Germany,,India,,US,and,UK,,at,the,industry,level.Table&A5&)&Founders&vs.&Descendants&vs.&Professional&CEOs&)&Cross&sectional&differences&in&Hours&Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent&Variable
Family&CEO&(2nd&generation&onwards) !0.162*** !0.094*** !0.102*** !0.099*** !0.088*** !0.087*** !0.082***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Founder&CEO !0.228*** !0.160*** !0.130*** !0.116*** !0.088*** !0.090*** !0.086***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029)
Family&Ownership,&External&CEO 0.029
(0.018)
Founder&Ownership,&External&CEO !0.021
(0.041)
CEO&holds&positions&in&other&firms 0.015 0.010 0.013 0.008 0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Ln(CEO&age) !0.147*** !0.164*** !0.127*** !0.128*** !0.130***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Ln(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.004 !0.007 !0.006 !0.005 !0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
CEO&holds&College&degree 0.055* 0.051* 0.049* 0.063** 0.063**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
CEO&holds&MBA&degree 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.010
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
CEO&has&study/work&experience&abroad 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.002 0.001
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Ln(Employment) 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Ln(Firm&age) 0.004 0.004 0.001 !0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
MNE 0.022 0.018 0.025 0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Number&of&CEO&direct&reports 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
COO&exists !0.006 !0.016 !0.015
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Number&of&sons&in&management&positions !0.045** !0.056** !0.056**
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Number&of&daughters&in&management&positions !0.016 !0.024 !0.023
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Data&collected&through&the&CEO&personal&assistant !0.000 0.002
(0.016) (0.016)
Constant 3.767*** 3.634*** 4.088*** 4.003*** 3.783*** 3.797*** 3.801***
(0.008) (0.027) (0.169) (0.168) (0.178) (0.184) (0.184)
R)squared 0.123 0.213 0.223 0.237 0.249 0.344 0.345
Number&of&firms 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114
Test&Family&CEO&(2nd&gen)=&Founder&CEO,&p)value 0.0209 0.0195 0.328 0.5628 0.9982 0.9268 0.8946
Country&dummies n y y y y y y
Industry&dummies n n y y y y y
Noise&controls n n n n n y y
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS (robust standard errors in parenthesis). The
variable "CEO Hours Worked" is the log of the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding travel)
during the survey week. The variable "Start(End) of the Day" denotes the hour at which the CEO reported to start(end) the work!day. The
variable "Share time spent in personal activities" denotes the share of hours reported by the CEO as dedicated to leisure activities during working
hours. Family CEO (2nd generation)=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm but have not founded it
themselves, and 0 otherwise. Founder CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firmand have founded it
themselves, and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies are 33 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote if the time use data was
recorded by the PA; 55 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 29 interview week
dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the representativeness of the week and a dummy to denote weeks with a national or
religiousYholiday.
ln(Hours&Worked)Table&A6a&)&Response&to&Rain&Shocks&by&Ownership&)&Robustness
Dependent&Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiment Baseline Include&
CEO*rain&
interactions
Include&
firm*rain&
interactions
Include&
org*rain&
interactions
Include&
industry*rain&
interactions
Include&
state*rain&
interactions
Family&CEO !0.031 !0.025 !0.026 !0.036 !0.033 !0.026
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain 0.033 0.302 0.172 0.033 !0.093 0.017
(0.025) (0.354) (0.117) (0.041) (0.117) (0.088)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&Family&CEO !0.083** !0.099*** !0.087*** !0.072** !0.077** !0.078**
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&CEO&works&for&other&firms 0.021
(0.036)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&Ln(CEO&age) !0.040
(0.088)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&Ln(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) 0.020
(0.023)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&CEO&College !0.171*
(0.100)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*CEO&studied/worked&abroad !0.001
(0.039)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&CEO&MBA 0.003
(0.036)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&Ln(Employment) !0.011
(0.013)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&Ln(Firm&age) !0.021
(0.028)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*&MNE 0.005
(0.042)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*Number&of&direct&reports !0.000
(0.004)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*COO&exists 0.064
(0.078)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*Sons&in&Management !0.023
(0.029)
Dummy=1&if&extreme&rain&*Daughters&in&Management !0.025
(0.058)
Ln(Employment) 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Ln(Firm&age) !0.036** !0.036** !0.027 !0.036** !0.035** !0.037**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
MNE 0.059* 0.058* 0.057 0.059* 0.061** 0.055*
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Number&of&direct&reports 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
COO&exists !0.035 !0.038 !0.034 !0.056 !0.022 !0.050
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046)
Number&of&sons&in&management !0.016 !0.016 !0.015 !0.007 !0.023 !0.016
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Number&of&daughters&in&management !0.036 !0.037 !0.039 !0.026 !0.038 !0.035
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.031)
CEO&works&for&other&firms 0.031 0.023 0.032* 0.031 0.029 0.030
(0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Ln(CEO&age) !0.139** !0.123* !0.138** !0.141** !0.138** !0.149**
(0.058) (0.070) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
Ln(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) 0.002 !0.006 0.002 0.002 0.003 !0.000
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
College&degree 0.090* 0.130* 0.089* 0.089* 0.095* 0.086
(0.049) (0.068) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.053)
CEO&studied/worked&abroad 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.019
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Dummy&CEO&MBA !0.003 !0.002 !0.002 !0.003 0.004 !0.000
(0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 1.989*** 1.895*** 1.915*** 1.995*** 2.301*** 2.025***
(0.287) (0.340) (0.301) (0.288) (0.257) (0.282)
R)squared 0.193 0.195 0.194 0.193 0.203 0.206
Observations 1603 1603 1603 1603 1603 1603
Number&of&firms 349 349 349 349 349
Industry&dummies y y y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y y y
Test&Rain+Family&CEO*Rain=0&(p)value) 0.04 0.55 0.44 0.36 0.14 0.50
Test&joint&significance&of&Rain*CEO&characteristics&(p)value) 0.67
Test&joint&significance&of&Rain*&firm&characteristics&(p)value) 0.67
Test&joint&significance&of&Rain*&org&characteristics&(p)value) 0.90
Test&joint&significance&of&Rain*Industry&interactions&(p)value)
Test&joint&significance&of&Rain*State&interactions&(p)value) 0.00 0.05
ln(1+CEO&Hours&Worked)&)&Day&Level&
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. In all columns standard errors under coefficient are
clusteredJbyJfirm.JTheJvariableJ"CEOJHoursJWorked"JisJtheJlogJofJ1JplusJtheJtotalJhoursJJtheJCEOJdevotedJtoJworkJactivitiesJlastingJmoreJthanJ15JminutesJ
(excluding travel) during the survey day. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise.
"ExtremeJRain"JisJaJdummyJdenotingJintenseJrainfallJ(relativeJtoJtheJnonJMonsoonJperiod)JinJtheJareaJandJdayJwhereJtheJCEOJisJlocatedJ(dataJmeasuredJ
by the closest weather station, matched to the zipcode of the CEO activities for the day). Column 4 includes a full set of industry dummiesXExtreme rain
interactions. Column 5 includes a full set of state dummiesXExtreme rain interactions. Industry dummies are 19 two digits SIC codes. Noise controls
include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time use data was recorded by the CEO's Personal Assistant; 15 interviewer dummies; a dummy to
denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 7 interview week dummy; a self reported score given by the CEO to rank the
representativenessJofJtheJweekJandJaJdummyJtoJdenoteJweeksJwithJaJnationalJorJreligiousJholiday.Table&A6b&)&Response&to&Cricket&Shocks&by&Ownership&&)&Robustness
Dependent&Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experiment Baseline Include&
CEO*Cricket&
interactions
Include&
firm*Cricket&
interactions
Include&
org*Cricket&
interactions
Include&
industry*Cricke
t&interactions
Include&
state*Cricket&
interactions
Family&CEO !0.083** !0.087*** !0.086*** !0.084*** !0.085*** !0.084***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Cricket&game 0.074* !1.097** 0.223 0.219** 0.094 0.048
(0.040) (0.477) (0.148) (0.095) (0.118) (0.114)
Cricket&game&*&Family&CEO !0.120** !0.043 !0.024 !0.148** !0.099* !0.131**
(0.048) (0.071) (0.045) (0.070) (0.056) (0.062)
Cricket&game&*&Ln(CEO&age) 0.310***
(0.108)
Cricket&game&*&Ln(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) !0.078
(0.058)
Cricket&game*College 0.175
(0.119)
Cricket&game*CEO&studied/worked&abroad !0.003
(0.084)
Cricket&game&*&CEO&works&for&other&firms !0.067
(0.075)
Cricket&game&*&CEO&MBA !0.024
(0.107)
Cricket&game&*&Ln(Employment) !0.021
(0.056)
Cricket&game&*&Ln(Firm&age) !0.058
(0.086)
Cricket&game&*&MNE 0.288**
(0.115)
Cricket&game&*Number&of&direct&reports !0.017**
(0.008)
Cricket&game&*COO !0.085
(0.133)
Cricket&game&*Sons&in&Management !0.037
(0.087)
Cricket&game&*Daughters&in&Management 0.116**
(0.049)
Ln(Employment) !0.011 !0.011 !0.011 !0.011 !0.012 !0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Ln(Firm&age) 0.021 0.024 0.032 0.021 0.027 0.018
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
MNE 0.063 0.060 0.039 0.062 0.059 0.042
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
CEO&works&for&other&firms 0.045* 0.047* 0.050* 0.045* 0.043 0.043
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
Ln(CEO&age) !0.062 !0.077 !0.072 !0.060 !0.067 !0.088
(0.079) (0.081) (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) (0.082)
Ln(1+CEO&tenure&in&firm) 0.008 0.013 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.012
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
College&degree 0.080** 0.067 0.076* 0.085** 0.079* 0.056
(0.041) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.048)
Dummy&CEO&MBA !0.002 !0.004 !0.005 !0.002 !0.004 0.003
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
DidJtheJExecutiveJstudyJorJworkedJabroad? 0.040 0.043 0.038 0.042 0.045 0.043
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Number&of&direct&reports 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
COO&exists !0.001 0.001 !0.009 0.003 0.002 0.015
(0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.071) (0.066) (0.069)
Number&of&sons&in&management 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Number&of&daughters&in&management !0.039 !0.040 !0.030 !0.044 !0.033 !0.029
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.045) (0.043)
Constant 1.527*** 1.580*** 1.522*** 1.490*** 1.500*** 1.674***
(0.382) (0.388) (0.376) (0.382) (0.382) (0.396)
R)squared 0.096 0.097 0.100 0.097 0.100 0.113
Observations 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832 1832
Number&of&firms 353 353 353 353 353
Industry&dummies y y y y y y
Noise&controls y y y y y y
Test&Cricket+Family&CEO*Cricket=0&(p)value) 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.94 0.22
Test&joint&significance&of&Cricket*CEO&characteristics&(p)value) 0.00
Test&joint&significance&of&Cricket*&firm&characteristics&(p)value) 0.00
Test&joint&significance&of&Cricket*org&&characteristics&(p)value) 0.00
Test&joint&significance&of&Cricket*Industry&interactions&(p)value) 0.00
Test&joint&significance&of&Cricket*State&interactions&(p)value) 0.00
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All columns estimated by OLS. In all columns standard errors under coefficient are clustered by
firm and date. The variable "CEO Hours Worked" is the log of 1 plus the total hours the CEO devoted to work activities lasting more than 15 minutes (excluding
travel) during the survey day until 3pm. Family CEO=1 for those who own the firm or belong to the family that owns the firm, and 0 otherwise. "Cricket game" is a
dummy denoting that an IPL playoff, semifinal or final game was played and broadcasted on television on the day. Column 5 includes a full set of industry
dummiesXCricket interactions. Column 6 includes a full set of state dummiesXCricket interactions. Industry dummies are 19 two digits SIC codes. State dummies are
15 indicators denoting the state in which the firm is headquartered. Noise controls include: a dummy to denote cases in which the time use data was recorded by
the CEO's Personal Assistant; 15 interviewer dummies; a dummy to denote CEOs who formally report to an executive Chairman; 7 interview week dummy; a self
reportedJscoreJgivenJbyJtheJCEOJtoJrankJtheJrepresentativenessJofJtheJweekJandJaJdummyJtoJdenoteJweeksJwithJaJnationalJorJreligiousJholiday.
ln(1+CEO&Hours&before&3PM)Table&A7&)&Accounting&Data&)&Summary&Statistics
Mean Standard&
Deviation
Number&of&firms&
with&available&
information
Number'of'Employees 1502.35 10625.26 909
Sales'per'Employee'($) 295.51 3266.02 909
Capital'per'Employee'($) 61.15 283.03 700
Materials'per'Employee'($) 125.08 659.24 443
ROCE 0.12 0.10 493
Sales'growth'(1'year) 0.06 0.12 780
Tobin's'q 1.03 1.00 298
Notes: All data drawn from ORBIS, averages across the 3 years of accounting data used
in Table 6 (only years in which the CEO was in office are included). All variables
expressed'in'US$.'Accounting'data'run'between'2007'and'2013.